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Abstract	  
	  The	  period	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  is	  wrought	  with	  frustrations,	  broken	  trust	  and	  intense	  hurt	  as	  a	  state	  works	  to	  bring	  its	  society	  out	  of	  internal	  conflict.	  Post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  are	  designed	  to	  provide	  tools	  to	  move	  a	  state	  towards	  stability.	  While	  scholars	  have	  evaluated	  the	  different	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  reaching	  their	  goals,	  there	  is	  limited	  research	  into	  understanding	  why	  a	  state	  may	  implement	  one	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  over	  another.	  Specifically,	  what	  factors	  impact	  the	  form	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  states?	  This	  research	  presents	  six	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  through	  three	  theoretical-­‐derived	  categories,	  retributive	  justice,	  restorative	  justice	  and	  immunity	  measures,	  before	  examining	  three	  influencing	  factors:	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  external	  military	  funding	  and	  conflict	  termination	  type.	  Utilizing	  bivariate	  and	  multivariate	  regression,	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  influencing	  factors	  and	  the	  six	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  (trials,	  purges,	  truth	  commissions,	  reparations,	  amnesty	  and	  exiles)	  is	  tested.	  The	  results	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  analysis	  at	  the	  mechanism	  level,	  which	  reveal	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  influencing	  factor	  changes	  greatly	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	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Chapter	  One:	  Introduction	  	  When	  the	  news	  comes	  that	  an	  internal	  conflict	  has	  ended,	  there	  is	  a	  collective	  sense	  of	  relief	  that	  the	  conflicting	  sides	  are	  putting	  down	  their	  arms.	  The	  unfortunate	  reality	  is	  that,	  although	  the	  elites	  have	  declared	  an	  end,	  stability	  and	  peace	  do	  not	  immediately	  return.	  Not	  only	  can	  the	  physical	  violence	  endure	  for	  an	  extended	  period,	  but	  the	  frustrations	  of	  injustice,	  broken	  trust	  and	  intense	  hurt	  can	  simmer	  for	  much	  longer.	  This	  period	  between	  conflict	  and	  stability	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “post-­‐conflict.”	  It	  is	  a	  time	  wrought	  with	  the	  difficulties	  of	  transition	  and	  change	  as	  the	  state	  labors	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  violence	  and	  militarized	  period	  of	  conflict.	  The	  harm	  from	  the	  civil	  conflict	  continues	  to	  reverberate	  throughout	  the	  state,	  making	  progress	  forward	  a	  difficult	  and	  laborious	  process.	  	  During	  this	  post-­‐conflict	  period	  transitional	  justice	  often	  occurs.	  Included	  under	  transitional	  justice	  are	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  which	  vary	  in	  their	  benefits	  and	  drawbacks.	  These	  tools	  aim	  to	  help	  a	  society	  move	  forward	  through	  different	  manifestations	  of	  justice;	  some	  seek	  accountability	  and	  some	  cultivate	  forgiveness.	  The	  famous	  South	  African	  truth	  commissions	  are	  an	  example	  of	  these	  tools	  in	  action,	  but	  the	  options	  also	  include	  trials,	  reparations,	  purges,	  amnesty	  and	  exiles.	  Trials	  and	  purges	  often	  manifest	  as	  legal	  repercussions,	  while	  truth	  commissions	  and	  reparations	  are	  reparative	  and	  more	  holistic	  in	  their	  approach.	  Amnesty	  and	  exiles	  supply	  a	  different	  form	  of	  justice	  as	  they	  provide	  the	  space	  to	  move	  on	  from	  the	  conflict.	  	  Though	  the	  projected	  end	  goal	  is	  justice,	  these	  mechanisms	  vary	  greatly	  in	  their	  means.	  With	  different	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	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mechanisms	  to	  choose	  from,	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  answer:	  what	  factors	  impact	  the	  
form	  of	  post-­conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  states?	  	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  scholarly	  attention	  has	  focused	  on	  evaluating	  these	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Many	  of	  these	  studies	  seek	  to	  grade	  the	  mechanisms’	  ability	  to	  reach	  their	  goals	  of	  achieving	  justice.	  Often	  studies	  identify	  shortcomings	  or	  even	  harmful	  ramifications	  of	  implementing	  a	  particular	  mechanism.	  However,	  the	  existing	  scholarship	  is	  limited	  in	  that	  it	  has	  only	  just	  barely	  begun	  to	  wonder	  about	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  particular	  tool	  instead	  of	  another	  mechanism.	  The	  literature	  alludes	  to	  potential	  influencing	  factors,	  but	  very	  little	  empirical	  research	  has	  been	  conducted	  to	  back	  up	  these	  statements.	  There	  are	  a	  few	  studies	  that	  have	  worked	  to	  identify	  some	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  implementation.	  However,	  the	  literature	  is	  limited	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  potential	  reasons	  and	  correlations	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  evaluated.	  This	  study’s	  value	  lies	  in	  helping	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  gap	  by	  testing	  the	  relationships	  of	  several	  central	  factors	  alluded	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  through	  empirical,	  quantitative	  research.	  	  Utilizing	  the	  literature	  available	  that	  discusses	  the	  advantages	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  different	  tools,	  careful	  consideration	  was	  given	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  three	  specific	  factors	  evaluated	  in	  this	  study.	  With	  the	  literature	  alluding	  to	  many	  potential	  influencing	  factors,	  this	  study	  chose	  factors	  that	  were	  quantifiable	  and	  testable,	  but	  were	  also	  built	  out	  of	  findings	  from	  previous	  research.	  The	  factors	  are	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  during	  conflict,	  external	  military	  funding,	  and	  conflict	  termination	  type.	  Magnitude	  of	  violence	  captures	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  conflict	  on	  society,	  while	  external	  military	  funding	  addresses	  the	  role	  of	  external	  actors	  and	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their	  support	  in	  the	  conflict.	  Termination	  type	  serves	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  type	  of	  political	  environment	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict.	  Testing	  the	  relationship	  of	  three	  different	  influencing	  factors	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  adds	  to	  the	  scholarly	  work.	  This	  thesis	  begins	  with	  a	  detailed	  literature	  review	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  influencing	  factors.	  The	  mechanisms	  are	  arranged	  into	  three-­‐theoretically	  derived	  categories:	  retributive	  justice,	  restorative	  justice,	  and	  immunity	  measures.	  The	  value	  of	  this	  framework	  comes	  from	  understanding	  the	  fundamentally	  different	  means	  through	  which	  the	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  given	  category	  achieve	  justice.	  For	  example,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  an	  immunity	  measure,	  like	  amnesty,	  achieves	  justice	  utilizes	  a	  significantly	  different	  approach	  than	  trial,	  which	  is	  categorized	  as	  retributive	  justice.	  Each	  mechanism	  is	  presented	  with	  its	  relative	  merits	  and	  demerits.	  	  Following	  this	  overview	  is	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  influencing	  factors.	  With	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  specific	  factors,	  this	  section	  is	  briefer.	  To	  bridge	  this	  gap,	  the	  section	  reviews	  various	  referenced	  ideas	  and	  previous	  studies	  that	  have	  tested	  specific	  influencing	  factors	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Cherif	  Bassiouni	  (2002)	  provides	  a	  guideline	  of	  points	  that	  should	  be	  considered	  by	  a	  state	  when	  deciding	  to	  implement	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism,	  which	  gives	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  considering	  influencing	  factors.	  Dawn	  Rothe	  and	  Scott	  Maggard	  (2012),	  who	  have	  conducted	  the	  primary	  research	  testing	  influencing	  factors,	  look	  specifically	  at	  the	  role	  of	  international	  organizations,	  length	  of	  conflict	  and	  number	  of	  casualties.	  Other	  literature	  alludes	  to	  potential	  influencing	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factors,	  like	  external	  aid,	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  and	  the	  crossover	  between	  mechanisms,	  but	  does	  not	  provide	  specific	  hypotheses	  or	  tested	  outcomes.	  The	  methods	  chapter	  follows	  the	  literature	  review.	  This	  chapter	  reiterates	  the	  study’s	  research	  question	  and	  defines	  the	  variables.	  In	  carefully	  reviewing	  the	  influencing	  factors,	  the	  independent	  variables,	  and	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  the	  specific	  datasets	  used	  are	  introduced.	  For	  the	  first	  influencing	  factor,	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  the	  dataset	  is	  “Major	  Episodes	  of	  Political	  Violence,”	  which	  comes	  from	  the	  Integrated	  Network	  for	  Societal	  Conflict	  Research	  (INSCR).	  External	  military	  funding	  utilizes	  the	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  which	  has	  a	  specific	  dataset	  called	  “External	  Support	  Project:	  Primary	  Warring	  Party	  Dataset.”	  Conflict	  termination	  is	  included	  in	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  Justice	  Dataset.	  This	  dataset	  is	  also	  the	  provider	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  With	  a	  solidified	  understanding	  of	  the	  variables,	  the	  hypotheses	  are	  presented.	  The	  hypotheses	  are	  arranged	  by	  independent	  variable,	  but	  then	  separated	  into	  different	  predictions	  according	  to	  the	  theoretical	  framework,	  with	  the	  categories	  of	  retributive	  justice,	  restorative	  justice,	  and	  immunity	  measures.	  Lastly	  the	  chapter	  explains	  how	  the	  hypotheses	  were	  tested	  using	  STATA,	  specifically	  through	  bivariate	  and	  multivariate	  regression.	  The	  analysis	  begins	  with	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  each	  of	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  regressions.	  Following	  this	  overview,	  the	  hypotheses	  are	  reviewed	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  regression	  results.	  This	  evaluation	  reveals	  that	  only	  one	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  can	  be	  evaluated,	  as	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  used	  to	  create	  the	  hypotheses	  appear	  to	  be	  too	  aggregated.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  study	  adjusts	  the	  method	  of	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evaluating	  the	  hypotheses,	  to	  explore	  potentially	  meaningful	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  at	  the	  mechanism	  level.	  This	  modification	  reveals	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  as	  disaggregated	  units,	  removing	  the	  use	  of	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  during	  the	  analytical	  process.	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  regressions,	  in	  connection	  to	  each	  of	  the	  six	  mechanisms,	  are	  then	  presented,	  in	  order	  of	  the	  independent	  variables:	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  external	  military	  funding	  and	  conflict	  termination	  type.	  	  A	  reflection	  on	  the	  research	  concludes	  this	  study,	  covering	  the	  results,	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  study	  and	  recommendations	  for	  future	  research.	  This	  study’s	  answer	  to	  the	  research	  question	  is	  nuanced,	  with	  different	  findings	  for	  each	  mechanism.	  Trials	  find	  the	  influencing	  factors	  to	  be	  telling	  of	  implementation,	  with	  increased	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  decreasing	  its	  likelihood,	  while	  a	  victory	  increases	  a	  trial’s	  likelihood	  of	  implementation.	  Reparations’	  implementation	  was	  more	  likely	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  and	  a	  bargained	  outcome.	  Amnesty	  and	  exile	  both	  decrease	  in	  likelihood	  of	  implementation	  with	  increased	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  and	  a	  victory	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  exile.	  The	  influencing	  factors	  had	  no	  discernable	  relationship	  to	  purges	  and	  truth	  commissions.	  This	  application	  of	  the	  analysis	  to	  the	  research	  question	  reiterates	  the	  importance	  of	  mechanism-­‐level	  analysis.	  Each	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  tool	  has	  very	  different	  findings.	  	  The	  variety	  of	  results	  emphasizes	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  disaggregation	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  future	  research.	  In	  reflecting	  across	  the	  research,	  the	  strength	  and	  limitations	  are	  established,	  which	  helps	  to	  supply	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recommendations	  for	  future	  analysis.	  While	  this	  study	  adds	  to	  the	  literature	  by	  identifying	  potential	  influencing	  factors	  that	  are	  referenced	  in	  the	  literature,	  its	  research	  only	  tests	  three	  factors.	  The	  potential	  role	  of	  interactive	  tendencies	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  or	  the	  natural	  tendencies	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  reveals	  that	  additional	  research	  is	  needed.	  Understanding	  the	  patterns	  of	  implementing	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  also	  has	  normative	  implications.	  Being	  able	  to	  predict	  the	  type	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  implemented	  can	  help	  mobilize	  relevant	  actors	  and	  resources	  efficiently.	  In	  answering	  the	  research	  question	  the	  value	  of	  continued	  research	  is	  exposed,	  which	  can	  improve	  the	  transition	  to	  stability	  for	  states	  emerging	  from	  conflict.	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Chapter	  Two:	  Conceptualizing	  Post-­Conflict	  Justice	  Mechanisms	  
And	  Identifying	  Influencing	  Factors	  	  	  
I. Introduction	  	  
	  For	  states	  emerging	  from	  interstate	  violence,	  there	  are	  identifiable	  mechanisms	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  process	  of	  achieving	  justice.	  These	  tools	  vary	  in	  form,	  from	  prosecutions	  to	  reparations	  to	  exiles.	  Though	  states	  use	  different	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  the	  factors	  that	  influence	  the	  presence	  of	  different	  mechanisms	  remain	  a	  puzzle.	  This	  research	  seeks	  to	  identify	  why	  states	  use	  different	  mechanisms	  when	  they	  emerge	  from	  internal	  conflict,	  focusing	  on	  the	  a	  period	  categorized	  as	  “post-­‐conflict.”	  The	  specific	  research	  question	  asks:	  what	  factors	  impact	  the	  form	  of	  post-­
conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  states?	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  chapter	  will	  cover	  literature	  on	  both	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  and	  on	  potential	  influencing	  factors.	  	  This	  chapter	  opens	  with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  related	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  The	  range	  of	  information	  is	  essential	  to	  understanding	  this	  phenomenon	  and	  for	  framing	  the	  research	  carried	  out	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Experts	  do	  not	  clearly	  or	  concisely	  delineate	  the	  array	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Six	  of	  the	  most	  commonly	  mentioned	  mechanisms	  are	  presented:	  prosecutions,	  purges,	  truth	  commissions,	  reparations,	  exiles	  and	  amnesty.
	  
Figure	  1:	  Theoretically	  Derived	  Categories	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These	  six	  mechanisms	  differ	  in	  how	  they	  achieve	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  justice.	  To	  best	  understand	  these	  six	  mechanisms,	  they	  are	  framed	  into	  three	  theoretically	  derived	  categories,	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  diagram	  above.	  In	  this	  research,	  the	  categories	  used	  are	  retributive	  justice,	  restorative	  justice	  and	  immunity	  measures.	  These	  categories	  group	  together	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  similar	  in	  how	  they	  go	  about	  achieving	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  The	  importance	  of	  these	  similarities,	  and	  thus	  the	  categories,	  goes	  beyond	  merely	  increasingly	  intellectual	  accessibility	  of	  the	  concepts,	  but	  will	  be	  useful	  in	  formulating	  hypotheses	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  question.	  With	  this	  intentionality,	  prosecutions	  and	  purges	  are	  placed	  under	  retributive	  justice.	  Truth	  commissions	  and	  reparations	  come	  under	  restorative	  justice,	  and	  amnesty	  and	  exile	  fall	  under	  immunity	  measures.	  With	  this	  background	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  this	  chapter	  also	  casts	  a	  wide	  net	  over	  the	  different	  identifying	  factors	  of	  implementation.	  Information	  feeding	  this	  variable	  is	  primarily	  weaved	  into	  the	  literature	  surrounding	  the	  topic	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  although	  there	  are	  several	  studies	  that	  specifically	  research	  influencing	  factors.	  Cherif	  Bassiouni’s	  (2002)	  appropriate	  accountability	  mechanism	  factors	  are	  used	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  His	  factors,	  which	  he	  intended	  to	  be	  reviewed	  and	  weighed	  in	  the	  decision	  process	  of	  choosing	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  influencing	  factors.	  Other	  influencing	  factors	  either	  reinforce	  his	  outlined	  factors	  or	  rise	  out	  of	  different	  scholars.	  This	  section	  aids	  in	  justifying	  the	  independent	  influencing	  factors	  that	  are	  used	  in	  this	  study.	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II. Post-­Conflict	  Justice	  Mechanisms	  
	  Post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  exist	  as	  tools	  that	  aid	  in	  the	  process	  of	  transitioning	  out	  of	  conflict.	  They	  differ	  drastically	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  process	  and	  means	  that	  they	  use	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  transition.	  Post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  fall	  under	  the	  sweeping	  peace	  tool	  of	  reconciliation	  and	  within	  the	  overarching	  classification	  of	  transitional	  justice.	  Jennifer	  Llewellyn	  (2006)	  acknowledges	  that	  transitional	  justice	  often	  used	  encompasses	  all	  forms	  of	  justice	  that	  are	  initiated	  during	  a	  time	  of	  change.	  However,	  this	  wider	  net	  is	  notable	  as	  it	  “broaden[s]	  the	  idea	  of	  transitional	  justice	  beyond	  a	  demand	  for	  prosecution	  and	  punishment	  to	  cover	  such	  concerns	  as	  compensation,	  distributive	  and	  restorative	  justice”	  (Llewellyn	  2006).	  These	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  are	  the	  various	  sub-­‐tools	  that	  arise	  as	  means	  to	  achieve	  these	  broader	  goals;	  they	  are	  the	  actual	  instruments	  which	  are	  implemented	  and	  through	  which	  justice	  is	  carried	  out.	  	  Linking	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  together	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  “what	  should	  be	  achieved	  is	  not	  only	  a	  sense	  of	  justice,	  but	  the	  elimination	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice”	  (Bassiouni	  2002	  40).	  However,	  each	  sub-­‐tool	  differs	  in	  its	  means	  of	  generating	  justice	  and	  accountability	  and	  it	  is	  this	  variation	  that	  creates	  the	  three	  categories	  that	  are	  used	  in	  this	  section.	  The	  division	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  into	  three	  categories	  provides	  an	  intentional	  analytical	  framework	  to	  emphasize	  the	  nuances	  between	  the	  different	  paths	  to	  reach	  this	  bigger	  goal.	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A. Retributive	  Justice:	  Prosecutions	  &	  Purges	  
	  The	  category	  of	  retributive	  justice	  stands	  within	  post-­‐conflict	  justice,	  representing	  a	  route	  that	  channels	  vengeance	  and	  revenge	  in	  manners	  that	  are	  deemed	  properly	  sophisticated	  and	  orderly	  by	  many	  societies,	  while	  yielding	  a	  direct	  form	  of	  accountability	  (Santa	  Barbara	  2007).	  	  Retaliatory	  measures	  are	  directed	  through	  organized	  pathways;	  in	  the	  case	  of	  this	  research	  it	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  form	  of	  prosecutions	  and	  purges.	  Retributive	  justice	  provides	  a	  structured	  means	  through	  which	  to	  carry	  out	  limited	  versions	  of	  the	  “eye	  for	  eye”	  mentality	  (Santa	  Barbara	  2007).	  The	  mechanisms	  under	  retributive	  justice	  focus	  on	  holding	  perpetrators	  accountable	  for	  their	  actions.	  This	  form	  of	  justice	  utilizes	  a	  direct	  form	  of	  punishment,	  which	  is	  the	  manifestation	  of	  violence	  that	  is	  frequently	  imagined	  by	  the	  public.	  	  
i. Prosecutions	  	  
	  Prosecutions	  are	  a	  widely	  known	  tool	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  This	  term	  is	  often	  interchanged	  with	  the	  term	  “trial.”	  Key	  actors	  for	  executing	  this	  mechanism	  have	  emerged	  like	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  and	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  However,	  the	  literature	  surrounding	  prosecutions	  generates	  the	  consensus	  that	  this	  tool	  is	  not	  best	  utilized	  under	  every	  circumstance,	  with	  attention	  specifically	  focused	  on	  its	  merits	  and	  drawbacks	  (King	  2013,	  Santa	  Barbara	  2007,	  Bass	  2004).	  With	  the	  iteration	  of	  debated	  positives	  and	  negatives	  of	  prosecutions	  across	  the	  literature,	  the	  statement	  by	  King	  (2013)	  that	  “although	  prosecution	  serves	  many	  purposes	  in	  the	  quest	  for	  justice	  and	  peace	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  atrocity,	  it	  may	  not	  always	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be	  a	  country’s	  best	  option,”	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  is	  nuanced.	  Highlighting	  these	  differences	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  relative	  merits	  and	  drawbacks	  provides	  the	  ability	  for	  drawing	  connections	  to	  potential	  influencing	  factors.	  	  Prosecutions	  “remove	  dangerous	  leaders	  from	  politics	  and	  stigmatize	  them	  for	  their	  brutality,	  minimize	  their	  denial	  of	  past	  atrocities,	  and	  preempt	  vigilantism	  by	  victim	  groups”	  (Bass	  2004	  404).	  This	  individualization	  of	  justice	  identifies	  specific	  perpetrators,	  mitigating	  the	  tendency	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  societies	  to	  blame	  entire	  sub-­‐sets	  of	  the	  population	  for	  the	  violence.	  Such	  a	  tendency	  undermines	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  increase	  structural	  violence	  in	  the	  future	  (King	  2013).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Bass	  (2004)	  holds	  the	  belief	  that	  prosecutions	  are	  morally	  mandated	  because	  they	  place	  focus	  on	  the	  individuals	  who	  made	  the	  choices	  of	  violence,	  taking	  blame	  away	  from	  the	  state.	  The	  ability	  for	  prosecutions	  to	  signify	  a	  change	  of	  culture	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  society	  holds	  multiple	  merits.	  Trials	  reveal	  “a	  clean	  break	  from	  the	  prior	  regime	  and	  announce	  to	  the	  nation	  and	  the	  world	  that	  this	  new	  government	  upholds	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law”	  (King	  2013).	  Prosecutions	  act	  as	  a	  signal	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  within	  a	  state	  is	  being	  re-­‐instated.	  This	  signaling	  of	  progress	  aids	  in	  “rebuilding	  civic	  trust	  in	  public	  institutions”	  (Prosecutions	  of	  Massive	  Violations).	  This	  new	  culture	  generates	  two	  major	  benefits	  arising	  from	  prosecutions.	  Trials	  “communicate	  that	  the	  culture	  of	  impunity	  that	  permitted	  the	  abuses	  is	  being	  replaced	  by	  a	  culture	  of	  accountability,	  giving	  a	  sense	  of	  security	  to	  victims	  and	  a	  warning	  to	  those	  who	  might	  contemplate	  further	  abuses”	  (Kritz	  2002	  58).	  Scholars	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see	  the	  duality	  of	  providing	  security	  for	  victims	  and	  warning	  to	  perpetrators	  to	  hold	  merit	  in	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  generating	  long-­‐term	  peace.	  	  Providing	  security	  to	  victims	  is	  fostered	  through	  the	  identifying	  and	  prosecution	  of	  specific	  perpetrators,	  which	  brings	  a	  layer	  of	  trust	  and	  change	  into	  a	  transitioning	  society	  (King	  2013,	  Kritz	  2002).	  Acting	  as	  a	  warning,	  prosecutions	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  deterrent	  moving	  forward,	  dispelling	  an	  “aura	  of	  invincibility	  and	  impunity”	  that	  exists	  during	  periods	  of	  conflict	  (King	  2013).	  While	  scholars	  detail	  these	  merits,	  there	  is	  also	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature	  in	  acknowledging	  the	  significant	  drawbacks	  of	  trials.	  Insistence	  on	  criminal	  prosecutions,	  specifically	  of	  high	  level	  individuals,	  can	  generate	  intensified	  and	  drawn	  out	  conflict,	  or	  renew	  previously	  settled	  conflict,	  as	  the	  losing	  side	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  put	  to	  trial	  (Bass	  2004,	  King	  2013).	  	  Drawbacks	  of	  prosecutions	  include	  the	  limited	  implications	  of	  trials	  of	  individuals.	  By	  identifying	  individual	  perpetrators,	  prosecutions	  narrow	  the	  scope	  of	  truth	  seeking,	  and	  thus	  do	  not	  create	  a	  societal	  historical	  record.	  The	  role	  of	  prosecutions,	  with	  their	  individual	  focus,	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  detailed	  reporting	  and	  recording	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  its	  entirety	  (King	  2013).	  Additionally,	  individual	  prosecution	  is	  a	  high	  resource	  task,	  increasing	  the	  tendency	  for	  governments	  to	  choose	  a	  different	  path.	  The	  enormity	  of	  undertaking	  such	  a	  task,	  especially	  domestically,	  is	  an	  intimidating	  factor,	  particularlly	  for	  a	  resource-­‐depleted	  post-­‐conflict	  state	  (Prosecutions	  of	  Massive	  Violations).	  These	  drawbacks,	  alongside	  the	  previously	  discussed	  merits,	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  theorizing	  what	  incentives	  exist	  for	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  state	  to	  undertake	  a	  trial.	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ii. Purges	   	  
	  The	  second	  mechanism	  in	  the	  category	  of	  retributive	  justice	  is	  purges.	  This	  term	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  lustrations.	  The	  act	  of	  purging	  is	  when	  “individuals	  who	  supported	  or	  participated	  in	  violations	  committed	  by	  a	  prior	  regime	  may	  be	  removed	  from	  their	  positions”	  (Bassiouni	  2002	  34).	  This	  process	  can	  also	  be	  extended	  to	  include	  the	  prohibition	  of	  these	  individuals	  from	  holding	  office	  or	  decision-­‐making	  powers	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  years	  and	  may	  include	  the	  loss	  of	  certain	  benefits.	  Another	  framing	  of	  lustrations	  is	  that	  they	  are	  “a	  symbolic	  purification	  through	  the	  assignment	  of	  collective	  responsibility	  for	  the	  previous	  regime’s	  sins	  and	  subsequent	  collective	  punishment	  for	  that	  responsibility”	  (Chiu	  2011).	  Lustrations	  tend	  to	  target	  segments	  of	  the	  previous	  regime,	  so	  while	  they	  do	  place	  restraints	  on	  the	  individual,	  they	  are	  systematic	  in	  their	  targeting	  of	  a	  particular	  segment	  of	  society	  (David	  2006).	  	  This	  particular	  tool	  was	  first	  recognized	  in	  the	  international	  system	  in	  1991	  when	  it	  was	  implemented	  by	  Czechoslovakia.	  Its	  implementation	  produced	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  and	  controversy	  as	  it	  “either	  disqualified	  high-­‐ranking	  Communist	  cadres,	  secret	  police	  members	  and	  their	  collaborators	  from	  senior	  posts	  in	  the	  new	  administration	  and	  security	  forces,	  or	  it	  downgraded	  them	  to	  lower	  posts	  in	  the	  state	  hierarchy”	  (David	  2006	  348).	  The	  actors	  targeted	  were	  identified	  according	  to	  their	  positions	  in	  creating	  a	  society	  of	  distrust.	  For	  example,	  secret	  police	  forces,	  who	  spied	  on	  friends,	  co-­‐workers	  and	  family,	  raised	  levels	  of	  distrust	  during	  and	  following	  the	  conflict	  (Horne	  2014).	  Despite	  concerns	  that	  the	  lustration	  process	  would	  be	  utilized	  for	  political	  manipulation,	  Czechoslovakia	  was	  still	  able	  to	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streamline	  democracy	  and	  join	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU),	  which	  helped	  to	  elevate	  its	  perceived	  success	  (David	  2006).	  	  The	  trend	  to	  see	  purges	  implemented	  in	  post-­‐communist	  countries	  is	  correlated	  to	  the	  “communist	  legacy	  of	  distrust,”	  which	  new	  regime	  leaders	  sought	  to	  dispel	  (Horne	  2014).	  Understanding	  the	  history	  of	  purges	  provides	  insight	  into	  how	  the	  international	  community	  views	  this	  post-­‐conflict	  mechanism.	  Bassiouni	  reflects	  that	  “though	  punitive	  in	  nature,	  [this	  tool	  is]	  used	  essentially	  as	  a	  political	  sanction	  which	  carries	  moral,	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  consequences.”	  Yvonne	  Chiu	  (2011)	  in	  an	  article	  titled	  “Liberal	  Lustration”	  works	  to	  defend	  lustrations	  as	  an	  acceptable	  post-­‐conflict	  tool.	  The	  author	  links	  four	  specific	  justifications	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  best	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  respect	  moral	  individualism.	  These	  justifications	  include	  (1)	  complicity	  in	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  the	  “illegitimate	  regime,”	  	  (2)	  responsibility	  for	  representing	  the	  institutions	  that	  conducted	  harm,	  (3)	  holding	  a	  politically-­‐appointed	  office,	  and	  (4)	  dissolving	  the	  old	  regime	  legitimizes	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  new	  social	  contract	  (Chiu	  2011).	  The	  justifications	  from	  Chiu	  also	  demonstrate	  the	  role	  relegated	  to	  old	  regime	  elites	  when	  a	  state	  chooses	  to	  implement	  purges.	  Throughout	  this	  defense,	  Chiu	  confirms	  purges’	  placement	  under	  retributive	  justice	  as	  the	  four	  justifications	  she	  makes	  reiterate	  the	  need	  to	  hold	  perpetrators	  accountable.	  	  The	  call	  for	  individualism	  to	  help	  build	  trust	  is	  not	  always	  accepted.	  Purges	  can	  be	  extremely	  costly	  in	  their	  implications	  for	  the	  individual.	  With	  wide-­‐sweeping	  purges,	  the	  process	  relies	  on	  stereotypes	  from	  the	  past	  violence	  about	  class	  and	  categories	  of	  people,	  regardless	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  individual.	  As	  a	  result,	  tensions	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can	  increase	  and	  perpetrators	  may	  become	  more	  likely	  to	  act	  out	  against	  the	  new	  regime	  (Bassiouni	  2002).	  However,	  states	  that	  have	  utilized	  purges	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  are	  attempting	  to	  break	  clear	  from	  the	  former	  regime,	  providing	  a	  platform	  for	  new	  leaders	  to	  start	  with	  a	  fresh	  slate	  (Lie,	  Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007).	  This	  form	  of	  retributive	  justice	  is	  utilized	  because	  the	  investment	  input	  from	  the	  state	  is	  minimal	  and	  it	  addresses	  a	  large	  number	  of	  perpetrators	  at	  one	  time	  (Kritz	  2002).	  The	  conduct	  and	  implementation	  of	  purges	  is	  often	  less	  publically	  scrutinized,	  which	  provides	  a	  perpetrator	  with	  less	  harsh	  public	  reputation	  damage	  than	  a	  prosecution	  (Kritz	  2002).	  The	  history	  of	  purges,	  their	  justifications,	  their	  targeted	  population	  and	  the	  resource	  to	  outcome	  ratio	  are	  key	  components	  throughout	  the	  literature.	  These	  various	  components	  can	  translate	  into	  multiple	  leads	  to	  the	  potential	  pieces	  of	  the	  puzzle	  for	  understanding	  why	  a	  state	  may	  implement	  this	  form	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  	  	  
B. Restorative	  Justice:	  Truth	  Commissions	  &	  Reparations	  	  	  
	  Restorative	  justice	  fills	  a	  very	  a	  different	  role	  than	  retributive	  justice.	  While	  this	  category	  still	  seeks	  to	  produce	  accountability	  for	  conflict,	  restorative	  justice	  focuses	  its	  energy	  in	  matters	  that	  are	  reparative	  (Santa	  Barbara	  2007).	  	  Santa	  Barbara	  (2007)	  writes,	  In	  a	  restorative	  process,	  the	  perpetrator	  remains	  in	  the	  community,	  working	  to	  restore	  the	  trust	  of	  others,	  and	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  harm	  done.	  The	  process	  itself	  is	  victim-­‐centered,	  unlike	  retributive	  processes,	  and	  has	  far	  more	  possibility	  of	  healing	  and	  compensation	  for	  the	  victim.	  (182)	  	  This	  form	  of	  justice	  goes	  beyond	  punitive	  measures	  and	  cultivates	  a	  process	  of	  conversion	  to	  peace	  that	  is	  victim-­‐centered.	  Restorative	  justice	  is	  also	  seen	  as	  more	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culturally	  adjustable	  than	  other	  categories	  of	  justice,	  as	  the	  various	  types	  of	  mechanisms,	  ideally,	  are	  formed	  to	  best	  address	  the	  context	  within	  which	  they	  are	  situated	  (Santa	  Barbara	  2007).	  Post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  that	  fall	  under	  this	  category	  include	  truth	  commissions,	  memorialization,	  formal	  apologies	  and	  reparations.	  (Lie,	  Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007).	  Specifically,	  this	  literature	  review	  will	  feature	  truth	  commissions	  and	  reparations	  due	  to	  their	  prominence	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  their	  embodiment	  of	  the	  key	  features	  of	  restorative	  justice.	  	  	  
i. Truth	  Commissions	  
	  Truth	  commissions	  are	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  that	  push	  past	  the	  traditional	  view	  of	  justice	  by	  creating	  a	  forum	  for	  healing.	  While	  the	  example	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  is	  globally	  known,	  this	  mechanism	  exists	  in	  many	  more	  forms.	  Its	  utilization	  as	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  tool,	  especially	  in	  more	  recent	  years,	  has	  been	  questioned,	  and	  a	  schism	  exists	  in	  the	  literature	  in	  reflections	  about	  truth	  commissions.	  There	  are	  four	  traits	  that	  help	  define	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  truth	  commission.	  As	  a	  standard,	  a	  truth	  commission	  is	  (1)	  centered	  on	  past	  events,	  (2)	  rooted	  in	  a	  desire	  for	  an	  overall	  understanding,	  not	  a	  specific	  event,	  (3)	  in	  existence	  for	  a	  finite	  period,	  and	  (4)	  authorized	  in	  some	  way	  by	  a	  mandate	  (Bassiouni	  2002).	  When	  using	  truth	  commissions	  the	  means	  to	  peace	  is	  focused	  on	  researching	  and	  documenting	  facts.	  They	  work	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  human	  rights	  violations,	  particularly	  of	  the	  victims	  (Lie,	  Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007).	  These	  characteristics	  are	  not	  all-­‐
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encompassing,	  but	  they	  begin	  to	  illustrate	  how	  truth	  commissions	  differ	  from	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  listed	  under	  retributive	  justice.	  	  The	  role	  that	  truth-­‐discovery	  can	  play	  in	  bringing	  about	  justice	  is	  not	  consistently	  iterated,	  and	  “traditional	  justice	  scholars	  have	  viewed	  [truth	  commissions]	  variously	  as	  a	  sacrifice	  of	  justice,	  an	  attempt	  to	  do	  partial	  justice”	  (Llewellyn	  84).	  This	  assessment	  of	  truth	  commissions	  demonstrates	  its	  separation	  from	  the	  retributive	  justice	  tools,	  and	  highlights	  a	  thread	  within	  the	  literature	  about	  the	  definition	  and	  role	  of	  justice	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  reconciliation.	  Implementing	  a	  truth	  commission,	  some	  believe,	  limits	  the	  ability	  to	  pursue	  the	  traditional,	  Western	  conception	  of	  justice	  (Lundy	  and	  McGovern	  2008).	  This	  debate	  offers	  direct	  insight	  to	  the	  difference	  of	  approach	  by	  retributive	  justice	  and	  restorative	  justice.	  It	  exposes	  a	  critique	  of	  truth	  commission	  that	  arises	  from	  the	  traditional,	  Western	  views	  of	  justice	  that	  are	  fulfilled	  by	  retributive	  processes,	  such	  as	  prosecutions.	  	  The	  statement	  by	  Kritz	  (2006)	  that	  “an	  effective	  truth	  commission	  process	  needs	  to	  engage	  and	  confront	  all	  of	  society	  in	  a	  painful	  national	  dialogue	  and	  search	  for	  a	  deep	  understanding	  of	  what	  they	  did	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  what	  to	  do	  about	  it”	  illustrates	  the	  argument	  that	  justice	  must	  include	  difficult	  conversations	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  collective	  version	  of	  truth.	  However,	  even	  the	  role	  of	  truth	  commissions	  as	  a	  tool	  that	  generates	  a	  narrative	  of	  truth	  has	  received	  pushback	  from	  scholars.	  Rosalind	  Shaw	  (2005),	  in	  a	  report	  for	  the	  United	  States	  Institution	  of	  Peace,	  looks	  to	  Sierra	  Leone	  as	  an	  example	  of	  where	  truth	  commissions	  are	  implemented	  for	  reasons	  that	  do	  not	  match	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  public,	  particularly	  given	  Sierra	  Leone’s	  cultural	  tradition	  of	  societal	  forgetting.	  In	  the	  report,	  the	  follow	  statement	  illustrates	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the	  belief	  that	  this	  mechanism	  often	  oversteps	  its	  role	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  justice:	  Ideas	  concerning	  the	  conciliatory	  and	  therapeutic	  efficacy	  of	  truth	  telling	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  Western	  culture	  of	  memory	  deriving	  from	  North	  American	  and	  European	  historical	  processes.	  Nations,	  however,	  do	  not	  have	  psyches	  that	  can	  be	  healed.	  Nor	  can	  it	  be	  assumed	  that	  truth	  telling	  is	  healing	  on	  a	  personal	  level:	  truth	  commissions	  do	  not	  constitute	  therapy.	  (Shaw	  1)	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  role	  of	  Western	  perspectives	  of	  justice	  is	  seen	  as	  overshadowing	  the	  state’s	  traditional	  means	  of	  coping	  post-­‐conflict.	  While	  restorative	  justice	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  being	  more	  culturally	  adjustable	  than	  a	  mechanism	  under	  the	  category	  of	  retributive	  justice,	  the	  above	  quote	  highlights	  that	  Western	  perspectives	  are	  still	  present	  in	  truth	  commissions.	  Shaw’s	  report	  emphasizes	  that	  truth	  commissions	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  adjust	  to	  cultural	  differences,	  even	  if	  a	  state	  prefers	  a	  particular	  path	  forward	  post-­‐conflict,	  due	  to	  the	  wide-­‐spread	  Westernized	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  mechanisms.	  	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  trend,	  in	  states	  emerging	  from	  conflict,	  for	  the	  public	  to	  adopt	  a	  policy	  of	  forgive	  and	  forget.	  This	  mentality	  deviates	  from	  that	  Western	  perspective	  and	  is	  not	  conducive	  for	  truth	  commissions	  as	  it	  forbids	  delving	  back	  into	  the	  past	  and	  generating	  a	  common	  history.	  This	  “social	  forgetting,”	  or	  pushback	  against	  truth	  commissions	  derives	  from	  “fear	  of	  retaliation	  by	  perpetrators;	  fear	  of	  government	  reprisals;	  and	  concerns	  arising	  from	  the	  concurrent	  operation	  of	  different	  transitional	  justice	  mechanisms	  (Shaw	  2005	  4).”	  Social	  forgetting	  is	  also	  present	  in	  states	  that	  have	  sustained	  a	  long	  history	  of	  violence	  and	  have	  thus	  created	  social	  coping	  mechanisms	  for	  recovery	  (Shaw	  2005	  4).	  Patricia	  Lundy	  and	  Mark	  McGovern	  (2008)	  hypothesize	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  truth	  commissions	  are	  “linked	  to	  authoritarian	  regimes	  where	  there	  has	  been	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	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where	  human	  rights	  abuses	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  with	  impunity”	  (269).	  The	  variation	  regarding	  truth	  commissions	  as	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism,	  particularly	  under	  the	  category	  of	  restorative	  justice,	  stresses	  the	  different	  purposes	  the	  tool	  serves	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  different	  cultural	  perspectives.	  	  	  
ii. Reparations	  	  
	  The	  other	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  placed	  under	  the	  category	  of	  restorative	  justice	  is	  reparations.	  This	  particular	  tool	  utilizes	  compensation.	  The	  tool	  is	  a	  symbolic	  gesture	  from	  the	  perpetrators	  in	  acknowledging	  the	  inflicted	  suffering	  of	  victims	  (Santa	  Barbara	  2007;	  Bass	  2004).	  This	  gesture	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  aid	  in	  symbolic	  closure	  of	  conflict.	  Reparations	  stress	  restorative	  justice’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  trauma	  of	  victims	  and	  creates	  space	  for	  this	  trauma	  to	  be	  amended	  through	  concrete	  measures	  (Hamber	  and	  Wilson	  2002).	  	  The	  manifestations	  of	  reparations	  are	  often	  separated	  into	  either	  symbolic	  or	  materialistic	  acts.	  These	  symbolic	  acts	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  reburials,	  memorials	  or	  formal	  apologies.	  Significance	  of	  symbolic	  acts	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  dissemination	  of	  “the	  memory	  of	  the	  victims	  in	  a	  pubic	  matter,	  they	  disburden	  their	  families	  of	  their	  sense	  of	  obligation	  to	  keep	  the	  memory	  alive	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  move	  on”	  (UNCHR	  2008).	  Such	  measures,	  “particularly	  if	  the	  symbols	  are	  personalized,	  can	  concretize	  a	  traumatic	  event,	  and	  help	  re-­‐attribute	  responsibility….	  labeling	  responsibility	  can	  appropriately	  redirect	  blame	  towards	  perpetrators	  and	  relive	  the	  moral	  ambiguity	  and	  guilt	  survivors	  often	  feel”	  (Hamber	  and	  Wilson	  2002	  38).	  This	  specific	  type	  of	  reparations	  is	  increasingly	  implemented	  in	  tandem	  with	  truth	  commissions.	  When	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paired	  with	  truth	  commission,	  symbolic	  reparations	  could	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  hard	  copy	  of	  the	  final	  truth	  commission	  report	  and/or	  an	  individualized	  letter	  from	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  government	  (UNCHR	  2008).	  	  A	  material	  act	  of	  reparations	  is	  often	  related	  to	  economic	  compensation.	  The	  economic	  compensation	  could	  be	  hard	  cash,	  health	  services,	  new	  livestock	  or	  education	  packages	  (Lie,	  Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007,	  UNCHR).	  When	  possible,	  the	  cost	  of	  this	  tool	  is	  paid	  for	  by	  leaders	  in	  order	  to	  directly	  take	  ownership	  of	  past	  harm.	  This	  process	  of	  amends	  to	  the	  victims	  focuses	  energies	  on	  tangible	  forms	  of	  apology	  (Bass	  2004).	  	  	   There	  are	  major	  limitations	  to	  reparations.	  Like	  any	  of	  the	  tools	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  reparations	  cannot	  meet	  all	  the	  needs	  of	  victims,	  and	  victims	  may	  very	  well	  feel	  unsatisfied,	  even	  angry	  with	  the	  reparations	  delivered.	  There	  is	  no	  way	  to	  retract	  the	  past	  violence,	  and	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  in	  the	  vast	  amount	  of	  cases	  no	  amount	  of	  money	  will	  equal	  the	  cost	  of	  conflict	  (Hamber	  and	  Wilson	  2002).	  A	  report	  published	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  (2008)	  acknowledges	  that:	  The	  violations	  that	  reparations	  benefit	  are	  meant	  to	  redress	  are	  frequently	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  is,	  strictly	  speaking,	  irreparable.	  Nothing	  will	  restore	  a	  victim	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  ante	  after	  years	  of	  torture	  and	  illegal	  detention,	  or	  after	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  parent,	  a	  sibling,	  a	  spouse	  or	  a	  child.	  No	  amount	  of	  money	  or	  combination	  of	  benefits	  can	  erase	  either	  such	  experiences	  or	  some	  of	  their	  consequences.	  (10)	  	  Bass	  (2004)	  also	  acknowledges	  that	  reparations	  will	  never	  fix	  what	  has	  occurred,	  but	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  important	  that	  reparations	  be	  chosen	  with	  prudence	  and	  proportionality	  to	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  grievances.	  A	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  (UNCHR)	  report	  puts	  forth	  that	  reparations	  are	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meant	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  situations	  where	  human	  rights	  violations	  have	  been	  “gross	  and	  systematic”	  (UNCHR	  2008).	  	  Therefore,	  the	  “contexts	  in	  which	  reparations	  programmes	  are	  established	  are	  frequently	  characterized	  by	  weak	  institutional	  capacity,	  fractured	  social	  relations,	  very	  low	  levels	  of	  trust	  and	  a	  scarcity	  of	  financial	  resources”	  	  (UNCHR	  2002	  10).	  	  	   Furthermore,	  using	  this	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  forces	  victims	  to	  face	  their	  trauma	  and	  loss,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  ready.	  In	  a	  variety	  of	  cases	  studied	  by	  Hamber	  and	  Wilson	  (2002),	  the	  sentiment	  was	  expressed	  that	  “accepting	  reparations	  implies	  giving	  up	  hope	  that	  the	  disappeared	  will	  return	  alive”	  (45).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil’s	  reparations	  process,	  which	  included	  a	  symbolic	  act	  of	  naming	  streets	  after	  deceased	  (or	  missing)	  persons,	  there	  were	  families	  that	  refused	  to	  attend	  the	  re-­‐naming	  ceremony,	  as	  recognition	  of	  the	  reparation	  would	  signal	  a	  relinquishing	  of	  hope	  (Hamber	  and	  Wilson	  2002).	  Reparations	  focus	  attention	  on	  the	  redress	  of	  victims,	  and,	  despite	  their	  limitations,	  the	  literature	  provides	  a	  variety	  of	  potential	  answers	  to	  the	  puzzle	  of	  why	  some	  states	  may	  implement	  reparations	  as	  a	  form	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  	  	  
C. Immunity	  Measures:	  Amnesty	  &	  Exile	  	  
	  The	  category	  of	  immunity	  measures	  covers	  two	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms:	  amnesty	  and	  exile.	  Immunity	  measures	  remain	  separate	  from	  retributive	  and	  restorative	  justice	  as	  the	  process	  through	  which	  they	  address	  justice	  is	  fundamentally	  different.	  Binningsbo	  et	  al	  (2012)	  define	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  as	  “any	  process	  initiated…following	  an	  armed	  conflict	  that	  attempts	  to	  address	  wrongdoings	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which	  took	  place	  as	  part	  of	  that	  conflict”	  (733).	  As	  such,	  they	  include	  amnesty	  and	  exiles	  in	  their	  list	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  The	  immunity	  measures	  category	  covers	  a	  path	  that	  concedes	  immediate	  and	  direct	  accountability	  of	  perpetrators	  or	  restorative	  efforts	  for	  victims	  in	  order	  for	  the	  larger	  society	  to	  move	  forward.	  This	  category	  recognizes	  alternative	  ways	  to	  address	  wrongdoings,	  specifically	  through	  amnesty	  and	  exiles.	  In	  this	  way,	  immunity	  measures	  fit	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  transitional	  justice	  in	  that	  it	  is	  focused	  in	  moving	  a	  state	  out	  of	  and	  away	  from	  conflict.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  immunity	  measures	  are	  widely	  discussed	  alongside	  and	  employed	  in	  tandem,	  or	  sometimes	  instead	  of,	  other	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  This	  category	  has	  been	  questioned	  in	  the	  more	  contemporary	  literature,	  and	  international	  acceptance	  of	  these	  possible	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  has	  been	  declining	  (Jeffrey	  2014).	  Within	  the	  literature,	  the	  ability	  to	  even	  call	  amnesty	  or	  exile	  justice	  is	  contested,	  as	  some	  scholars	  cite	  that	  these	  mechanisms	  promote	  impunity	  and	  fail	  to	  provide	  closure	  or	  accountability	  for	  society	  (Jeffrey	  2014;	  Bassiouni	  2002;	  Greenwalt	  2000).	  Impunity	  versus	  immunity	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  that	  scholars	  repeatedly	  draw	  upon	  when	  framing	  the	  role	  of	  amnesty	  and	  exile	  as	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Impunity	  is	  widely	  seen	  as	  counterproductive	  to	  peace,	  even	  as	  the	  “antithesis	  of	  accountability”	  (Bassiouni	  2002	  52).	  Contrarily,	  the	  role	  of	  immunity	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  path	  to	  prevent	  extended	  or	  future	  violence.	  For	  this	  category,	  amnesty	  and	  exiles	  are	  catalogued	  under	  immunity,	  because	  they	  are	  initiated	  for	  preventative	  and	  punitive	  measures	  (Lie,	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Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007),	  which	  is	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  justice	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  	   	  
i. Amnesty	  
	  Amnesty	  offers	  a	  way	  forward	  in	  transitional	  justice	  by	  providing	  an	  official	  pardon	  to	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  violence.	  Amnesty	  can	  also	  be	  granted	  to	  top	  government	  or	  military	  officials,	  	  military	  members	  or	  participants	  in	  the	  conflict	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012).	  This	  granting	  of	  exclusion	  from	  forms	  of	  retributive	  justice,	  particularly	  prosecutions,	  is	  significant	  in	  that	  amnesty	  still	  provides	  the	  state	  a	  path	  forward	  and	  out	  of	  conflict.	  	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  restrictions	  amnesty	  places	  on	  holding	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  conflict	  accountable,	  the	  related	  literature	  contains	  tensions	  regarding	  its	  relative	  merits	  and	  drawbacks.	  	  Amnesties	  play	  the	  role	  of	  a	  bargaining	  tool,	  an	  incentive	  to	  bring	  conflicting	  sides	  to	  a	  peaceful	  settlement.	  While	  it	  “seems	  reasonable	  to	  believe	  that	  some	  sort	  of	  accountability	  process	  is	  necessary,	  however,	  in	  negotiating	  peace	  settlements,	  leaders	  might	  choose	  to	  forgo	  traditional	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  to	  secure	  an	  end	  to	  the	  violence”	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012	  735).	  In	  this	  manner,	  amnesties	  are	  “a	  transitional	  justice	  mechanism	  used	  not	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  to	  democracy,	  or	  from	  violence	  to	  peace,	  but	  to	  effect	  a	  transition	  in	  the	  first	  place”	  (Jeffrey	  2014	  105).	  This	  tool	  provides	  protection	  to	  those	  who	  might	  face	  repercussions	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict	  for	  their	  role	  in	  the	  conflict.	  Most	  often,	  amnesty	  blocks	  the	  ability	  to	  prosecute	  perpetrators	  later	  in	  the	  transistion	  out	  of	  conflict.	  (Jeffrey	  2014;	  Lie,	  Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007).	  While	  amnesty,	  in	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this	  capacity,	  provides	  an	  incentive	  for	  conflict	  to	  end,	  it	  also	  initiates	  a	  debate	  about	  the	  deterrence	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  future.	  	  In	  recent	  decades,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  transition	  away	  from	  “blanket	  amnesties”	  or	  offers	  for	  unconditional	  amnesty.	  Pressure	  from	  the	  international	  community	  has	  largely	  generated	  this	  shift	  (Duggard	  1999;	  Jefferson	  2014).	  While	  it	  used	  to	  be	  a	  predictable	  and	  consistent	  mechanism	  for	  states	  that	  were	  moving	  away	  from	  repression	  and	  towards	  democracy,	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  and	  truth	  commissions	  have	  made	  amnesty’s	  presence	  less	  definitive	  and	  predictable	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  scholars	  (Dugard	  1999).	  Additionally,	  the	  stance	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  has	  evolved	  over	  time,	  aiding	  in	  this	  shift	  of	  form	  and	  implementation	  (Jeffrey	  2014).	  Jeffrey	  expresses	  the	  perceived	  lack	  of	  accountability,	  which	  may	  account	  for	  this	  shift,	  stating:	  [A]n	  inherent	  danger	  lies	  in	  holding	  out	  the	  prospect	  of	  an	  amnesty	  to	  warring	  parties:	  namely,	  doing	  so	  holds	  the	  state	  or	  party	  issuing	  the	  amnesty,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  victims	  of	  wrongs,	  hostage	  to	  a	  sort	  of	  blackmail	  that	  demands	  impunity	  for	  human	  rights	  violations.	  (Jeffrey	  2014)	  	  Greenwalt	  (2002)	  illustrates	  the	  danger	  described	  by	  Jeffrey	  in	  that	  “amnesties	  for	  those	  who	  have	  committed	  murder	  and	  torture	  for	  oppressive	  governments	  are	  unjust”	  (203).	  This	  injustice	  is	  related	  to	  the	  graveness	  of	  the	  violence	  and	  thus	  brings	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  amnesty	  to	  address	  certain	  forms	  of	  violence.	  	  A	  portion	  of	  the	  literature	  emphasizes	  the	  constraint	  amnesty	  puts	  on	  the	  ability	  for	  states	  to	  carry	  out	  justice.	  The	  restrictions	  that	  amnesty	  upholds	  when	  implemented	  are	  debated,	  as	  they	  highlight	  a	  tension	  about	  the	  necessity	  of	  holding	  perpetrators	  accountable	  for	  particular	  crimes	  or	  scenarios	  (Greenwalt	  2000).	  	  Amnesties,	  according	  to	  de	  Greiff,	  are	  concerning	  since	  “putting	  some	  people	  above	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the	  law,	  a	  culture	  of	  impunity	  can	  become	  entrenched”	  (Prosecutions	  of	  Massive	  Violations).	  	  This	  “culture	  of	  impunity”	  reinforces	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice	  that	  existed	  during	  the	  conflict,	  failing	  to	  provide	  a	  sense	  of	  change,	  security	  and	  trust	  in	  the	  new	  society.	  There	  is	  a	  fear	  that	  amnesty	  cannot	  adequately	  provide	  deterrence	  for	  future	  conflict,	  as	  it	  sets	  a	  precedent	  for	  pardoning	  of	  violence.	  	  
ii. Exiles	  	  
	  The	  placement	  of	  exiles	  under	  the	  category	  of	  immunity	  measures	  illustrates	  its	  specific,	  and	  often	  debated,	  role	  in	  bringing	  about	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  Exiles	  are	  understood	  as	  the	  “removal	  of	  perpetrators”	  in	  order	  “to	  identify,	  stigmatize	  and	  even	  physically	  remove	  certain	  individuals	  from	  a	  region	  of	  conflict”	  (Kerr	  and	  Mobekk	  2007	  7).	  This	  mechanism	  can	  be	  mandated	  or	  it	  can	  be	  self-­‐initiated	  by	  the	  perpetrators.	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  perpetrator	  may	  be	  fleeing	  from	  the	  state	  to	  avoid	  being	  held	  accountable	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012;	  Lie,	  Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007).	  Exiles	  act	  as	  incentives	  to	  prevent	  extended	  or	  future	  violence	  (Lie,	  Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007).	  Within	  the	  category	  of	  immunity	  measures,	  exiles	  are	  believed	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  transition	  out	  of	  conflict	  by	  allowing	  other	  processes	  towards	  peace	  and	  stability	  to	  continue.	  With	  this	  shift	  perpetrators	  cannot	  “partake	  in	  the	  peace	  processes	  or	  continue	  unduly	  to	  influence	  a	  fragile	  transitional	  society,	  nor	  can	  they	  continue	  to	  elicit	  fear	  in	  victims	  and	  their	  families”	  (Kerr	  and	  Mobekk	  2007	  7).	  However,	  exiles	  constrain	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  victims	  to	  see	  perpetrators	  held	  responsible,	  and	  thus	  there	  is	  no	  clearly	  established	  accountability	  or	  punishment	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(Lie,	  Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007).	  The	  road	  out	  of	  conflict	  is	  not	  clear	  for	  a	  state,	  and	  exiles	  offer	  both	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  as	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism,.	  These	  characteristics	  can	  make	  appealing	  arguments	  as	  to	  why	  states	  may	  or	  may	  not	  initiate	  exiles.	  	  	  
III. Influencing	  Factors	  
	  The	  literature	  is	  filled	  with	  off-­‐handed	  references	  to	  potential	  influencing	  factors,	  but	  few	  scholars	  carry	  out	  a	  careful	  and	  intentional	  study	  of	  the	  factors	  influencing	  the	  implementation	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice,	  never	  mind	  the	  specific	  type	  or	  category	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  Within	  the	  previous	  section,	  which	  conceptualizes	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  there	  are	  references	  to	  possible	  influencing	  factors.	  This	  section	  reviews	  the	  literature,	  answering	  the	  question:	  Are	  there	  specific	  influencing	  factors	  that	  can	  be	  tied	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  implementation?	  	  The	  literature	  certainly	  postulates	  potential	  influencing	  factors.	  Bassiouni’s	  “Appropriate	  Accountability	  Mechanism”	  guidelines	  are	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  this	  section	  of	  the	  chapter.	  His	  list	  encompasses	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  factors	  mentioned	  across	  the	  literature	  and	  thus	  provides	  a	  place	  to	  begin	  exploring	  possibilities.	  Bassiouni’s	  guidelines	  are	  designed	  to	  aid	  the	  decision	  process	  of	  undertaking	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  and	  are	  therefore	  limited	  in	  their	  scope.	  Given	  that	  Bassiouni’s	  list	  was	  originally	  created	  to	  guide	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  factors	  capture	  characteristics	  about	  the	  conflict	  itself	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  state	  emerging	  out	  of	  the	  conflict.	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Beyond	  his	  guidelines	  the	  literature	  highlights	  the	  influence	  of	  external	  actors,	  financial	  aid	  and	  the	  interconnected	  relationship	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  to	  each	  other.	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Potential	  Influencing	  Factors	  Referenced	  in	  Literature	  
	   The	  “Appropriate	  Accountability	  Mechanism”	  guidelines	  set	  forth	  by	  Bassiouni	  are	  intended	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  of	  choosing	  which	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism(s)	  to	  implement.	  Given	  that	  the	  guidelines	  would	  ideally	  be	  used	  by	  states	  emerging	  from	  conflict,	  the	  factors	  listed	  provide	  vital	  insight	  into	  the	  influences	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Bassiouni’s	  intention	  with	  these	  guidelines	  is	  that	  each	  factor	  is	  evaluated	  individually	  and	  collectively.	  Bassiouni	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  decision	  must	  be	  made	  in	  good	  faith.	  The	  eleven	  factors	  specified	  are:	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(a) The	  gravity	  of	  violation:	  for	  example,	  is	  it	  a	  jus	  cogens	  violation?	  (Genocide,	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  war	  crimes);	  (b) The	  extent	  and	  severity	  of	  the	  victimization;	  	  (c) The	  number	  of	  accused;	  	  (d) Those	  who	  are	  accused	  (e.g.,	  the	  senior	  architect,	  low-­‐level	  executor,	  bureaucrat);	  (e) The	  extent	  to	  which	  both	  sides	  are	  equally	  committed	  to	  international	  criminal	  standards;	  (f) The	  current	  government:	  is	  the	  violator	  regime	  still	  in	  power	  either	  	  de	  
jure	  or	  de	  facto?;	  	  (g) The	  competence	  and	  independence	  of	  the	  domestic	  judiciary;	  (h) The	  evidentiary	  issues;	  (i) The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  conflict	  or	  violations	  have	  subsided;	  (j) Cultural	  concerns	  or	  ‘the	  will’	  of	  the	  community;	  (k) Nature	  of	  the	  conflict:	  international	  or	  internal	  armed	  conflict,	  or	  repressive	  regime.	  (Bassiouni	  2002	  42)	  	  From	  these	  factors,	  Bassiouni	  insinuates	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  different	  factors	  should	  lead	  to	  different	  mechanisms.	  For	  example,	  he	  strongly	  advocates	  that	  if	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  violence	  includes	  a	  jus	  cogens	  violation	  then	  there	  must	  be	  a	  prosecution.	  However,	  Bassiouni	  also	  believes	  that	  beyond	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  a	  factor,	  the	  scale,	  or	  extent,	  of	  a	  factor	  can	  create	  a	  different	  path	  forward.	  As	  such,	  he	  argues	  that	  large-­‐scale	  victimization	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time	  requires	  a	  truth	  commission	  with	  a	  prosecution.	  His	  decision-­‐making	  process	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  is	  multi-­‐causal.	  The	  eleven	  factors	  do	  not	  work	  in	  isolation,	  but	  rather	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  alongside	  each	  other.	  Furthermore,	  the	  eventual	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  will	  also	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  various	  features	  of	  the	  conflict	  itself.	  	  	   Arising	  from	  Bassiouni’s	  work,	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  (2012)	  completed	  a	  research	  project	  answering	  a	  similar	  question	  as	  this	  study.	  Their	  research	  focus,	  however,	  was	  solely	  on	  African	  states.	  In	  their	  literature	  review,	  they	  assert	  that	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“previous	  studies	  have	  primarily	  concentrated	  on	  using	  a	  case-­‐study	  approach	  to	  evaluate	  a	  specific	  case,	  a	  specific	  [post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism],	  crimes	  committed	  or	  conflict	  resolution	  by	  type	  or	  duration	  of	  peace	  after	  completion	  of	  a	  [post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism]”	  (Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  2012	  195).	  As	  such,	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  employ	  an	  empirical,	  quantitative	  study	  that	  employs	  bivariate	  and	  multivariate	  components.	  The	  independent	  variables	  were	  types	  of	  conflict,	  length	  of	  conflict,	  number	  of	  previous	  regime	  changes,	  number	  of	  casualties	  and	  the	  role	  of	  international	  organizations.	  Post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  served	  as	  a	  broad	  dependent	  variable,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  further	  coded	  into	  specific	  mechanisms.	  	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  found	  that	  the	  predication	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  was	  significant	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  international	  organizations.	  Specifically,	  the	  research	  finds	  “most	  importantly,	  that	  action	  by	  the	  [United	  Nations]	  during	  a	  conflict	  is	  very	  important	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  to	  materialize”	  (Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  2012	  215).	  The	  other	  key	  finding	  identified	  by	  the	  authors	  is	  the	  significance	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  involvement.	  The	  logistic	  regression	  models	  aimed	  to	  predict	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  given	  the	  length	  of	  conflict,	  number	  of	  causalities	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  international	  organizations,	  found	  that	  the	  number	  of	  casualties	  were	  predictors	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  prosecutions	  and	  truth	  commissions	  and	  that	  length	  of	  conflict	  was	  a	  predictor	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  amnesty	  (Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  2012).	  	  	  Adding	  to	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard’s	  findings,	  the	  literature	  supports	  the	  importance	  of	  international	  organizations,	  but	  also	  suggests	  the	  importance	  of	  external	  investment	  as	  an	  influence	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	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mechanisms.	  	  When	  a	  state	  emerges	  from	  conflict,	  leaders	  have	  high-­‐stakes	  in	  convincing	  multi-­‐national	  corporations	  that	  their	  state	  is	  stable	  and	  a	  safe	  place	  to	  invest,	  and	  thus	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  efforts	  can	  be	  used	  to	  prove	  their	  stability	  (Appel	  and	  Loyle	  2012).	  Post-­‐conflict	  justice	  is	  costly,	  but	  the	  desire	  to	  indicate	  to	  investors	  that	  the	  state	  is	  committed	  to	  remain	  free	  of	  conflict	  can	  outweigh	  the	  price.	  A	  post-­‐conflict	  state	  has	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  risk	  associated	  to	  it,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  investors,	  but	  it	  also	  holds	  great	  potential	  growth	  and	  profit:	  Post	  conflict	  justice	  offers	  a	  signal	  of	  stability	  by	  providing	  a	  process	  of	  acknowledgement	  and	  reconciliation	  and	  through	  strengthening	  the	  political	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  host	  government.	  Secondly,	  due	  to	  both	  the	  costly	  nature	  of	  implementing	  post	  conflict	  justice	  domestically	  and	  the	  international	  reputational	  effects	  for	  reneging	  on	  post	  conflict	  justice	  commitments,	  potential	  investors	  are	  able	  to	  recognize	  the	  credibility	  of	  this	  signal.	  (Appel	  and	  Loyle	  2012	  686)	  	  Elham	  Atashi	  labels	  this	  desire	  for	  a	  state	  to	  build	  its	  credibility	  for	  external	  aid	  and	  investment	  as	  the	  “peace	  dividend.”	  Backing	  Appel	  and	  Loyle’s	  argument,	  Atashi	  provides	  a	  broader	  view	  on	  the	  incentive	  to	  implement	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  as	  he	  links	  it	  back	  to	  the	  investment	  by	  local	  actors:	  	  The	  term	  ‘peace	  dividend’	  has	  been	  broadly	  defined	  as	  social,	  political	  and	  psychological	  benefits	  that	  accrue	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  a	  peace	  process.	  From	  this	  view,	  external	  aid	  is	  channeled	  into	  peace	  dividends	  to	  transform	  a	  conflict	  by	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  and	  therefore	  a	  significant	  component	  of	  peacebuilding.	  It	  is	  also	  hoped	  that	  economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity	  can	  create	  incentives	  on	  the	  ground	  by	  convincing	  people	  that	  they	  are	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  peace	  process,	  thereby	  increasing	  public	  support.	  (Atashi	  2011	  209)	  	  Both	  of	  these	  articles	  see	  the	  role	  of	  external	  aid	  and	  investment	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  implementing	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  The	  role	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  in	  legitimizing	  the	  state’s	  commitment	  to	  progress	  signals	  to	  actors,	  particularly	  those	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with	  investment	  abilities,	  that	  the	  state	  is	  stable	  and	  reliable.	  However,	  neither	  article	  specifies	  the	  form	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  that	  would	  be	  implemented.	  	  	   A	  more	  complicated	  influencing	  factor	  is	  vaguely	  touched	  upon	  in	  the	  literature.	  Most	  of	  the	  literature	  addresses	  the	  mechanisms	  as	  singular	  modalities,	  isolating	  a	  particular	  mechanism	  and	  discussing	  it	  as	  a	  singular	  tool.	  The	  mechanisms	  do	  not	  act	  in	  isolation,	  but	  are	  complementary	  (Rothe	  and	  Mullins	  2008).	  There	  is	  no	  single	  formula,	  yet	  the	  international	  community	  often	  forgets	  the	  implication	  of	  utilizing	  multiple	  tools	  within	  the	  toolbox	  of	  justice	  (Kritz	  2002)	  The	  crossover	  between	  the	  mechanisms	  is	  mentioned	  in	  the	  literature	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  interactions	  of	  truth	  commissions,	  reparations	  and	  amnesty,	  but	  there	  is	  not	  a	  clear	  link	  identified	  between	  the	  presence	  of	  one	  mechanism	  and	  the	  presence	  (or	  absence)	  of	  another	  mechanism.	  	  Rothe	  and	  Mullins	  (2008)	  address	  this	  interconnected	  influence	  through	  two	  case	  studies	  that	  highlighted	  the	  integrated,	  multiple	  mechanisms	  at	  play	  at	  the	  same	  time	  with	  a	  concentrated	  focus	  on	  evaluating	  the	  impact	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  as	  a	  holistic	  system.	  Rothe	  and	  Mullins	  (2008)	  focus	  on	  how	  “the	  strengths	  of	  each	  mechanism	  generally	  counter	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  others”	  (92).	  While	  their	  research	  provides	  little	  insight	  into	  the	  identification	  of	  influencing	  factors,	  it	  does	  highlight	  the	  symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  the	  different	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Another	  example	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  use	  of	  another	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  is	  briefly	  highlighted	  in	  Shaw’s	  (2005)	  study	  that	  looks	  at	  truth	  commissions	  in	  Sierra	  Leone.	  In	  the	  paper,	  three	  potential	  difficulties	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in	  implementing	  truth	  commissions	  are	  “fear	  of	  retaliation	  by	  perpetrators;	  fear	  of	  government	  reprisals;	  and	  concerns	  arising	  from	  the	  concurrent	  operation	  of	  different	  transitional	  justice	  mechanisms”	  (Shaw	  2005).	  	  While	  the	  last	  point	  is	  not	  further	  explained	  within	  Shaw’s	  article,	  the	  concurrent	  or	  symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  methods	  could	  reveal	  a	  different	  way	  in	  which	  to	  understand	  why	  some	  states	  are	  using	  a	  particular	  type,	  or	  potentially	  a	  set	  of,	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  	  	  
IV. Conclusion	  	  
	  Reaching	  across	  the	  literature	  to	  generate	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  information	  related	  to	  factors	  that	  influence	  their	  implementation	  builds	  knowledge	  relative	  to	  answering	  the	  research	  question.	  	  The	  construction	  of	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  frames	  the	  means	  through	  which	  justice	  is	  obtained	  by	  the	  mechanisms.	  The	  literature	  related	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  is	  more	  developed	  than	  that	  of	  the	  influencing	  factors.	  Literature	  and	  research	  on	  influencing	  factors	  is	  considerably	  limited,	  with	  few	  studies	  testing	  to	  see	  what	  pressures	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  particular	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism.	  However,	  the	  array	  of	  potential	  influencing	  factors	  demonstrates	  that	  many	  possibilities	  exist	  in	  testing	  these	  relationships.	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Chapter	  Three:	  Methodology	  
	  While	  the	  previous	  chapter	  outlined	  literature	  discussing	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  and	  potential	  influencing	  factors	  of	  implementation,	  only	  a	  few	  studies	  have	  attempted	  to	  test	  factors	  that	  impact	  the	  form	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  states.	  Given	  this	  gap,	  this	  research	  identifies	  the	  relationship	  between	  potential	  influencing	  factors	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  The	  selection	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  from	  the	  array	  of	  influencing	  factors	  presented	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  begins	  the	  chapter.	  This	  process	  of	  choosing	  the	  influencing	  factors	  leads	  to	  three	  independent	  variables:	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  external	  military	  funding	  and	  conflict	  termination	  type.	  Operationalizing	  the	  independent	  variables	  requires	  careful	  defining	  of	  the	  terms.	  Post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  are	  also	  characterized	  and	  operationalized.	  	  With	  the	  variables	  defined,	  the	  study’s	  hypotheses	  are	  presented,	  highlighting	  potential	  causal	  mechanisms	  between	  the	  influencing	  factors	  and	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  These	  hypotheses	  are	  constructed	  utilizing	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  utilized	  in	  the	  literature	  review.	  Lastly,	  the	  actual	  methodology	  to	  test	  the	  hypotheses	  is	  explained.	  The	  methods	  are	  quantitative	  in	  nature	  and	  employ	  bivariate	  and	  multivariate	  regressions.	  	  	  
I. Influencing	  Factors:	  Independent	  Variables	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  question,	  what	  factors	  impact	  the	  form	  of	  post-­
conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  states,	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  clearly	  establish	  and	  define	  the	  variables	  used.	  The	  independent	  variables	  in	  this	  study	  are	  the	  influencing	  factors.	  
34	  	  
As	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  chapter,	  there	  are	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  suggested	  influencing	  factors.	  For	  this	  research,	  the	  three	  independent	  variable	  categories	  will	  be	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  external	  military	  funding	  and	  conflict	  termination.	  Each	  of	  these	  three	  independent	  variables	  have	  been	  drawn	  out	  of	  the	  literature	  and	  will	  be	  captured	  in	  this	  study	  through	  indicators,	  which	  serve	  to	  operationalize	  the	  factors.	  	  	  
A. Selecting	  the	  Influencing	  Factors	  to	  Test	  
	  Given	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  suggested	  influencing	  factors	  and	  the	  limited	  amount	  of	  previous	  research	  testing	  these	  relationships,	  there	  were	  many	  possible	  paths	  for	  this	  study.	  Therefore,	  the	  choice	  of	  particular	  independent	  variables	  arose	  from	  findings	  of	  previous	  research.	  The	  selection	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  provides	  the	  ability	  to	  capture	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  conflict	  on	  the	  state.	  Its	  inclusion	  comes	  out	  of	  Bassiouni’s	  guidelines,	  where	  he	  outlines	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  gravity	  of	  violation,	  the	  extent	  and	  severity	  of	  victimization,	  the	  number	  of	  accused	  and	  the	  society’s	  resolve	  (Bassiouni	  2002).	  Some	  of	  the	  items	  in	  his	  guidelines	  are	  extremely	  hard	  to	  capture,	  such	  as	  “will	  of	  community.”	  However,	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  violence	  and	  the	  severity	  of	  its	  impact	  on	  society	  are	  an	  important	  aspect,	  especially	  when	  considered	  alongside	  the	  goals	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  These	  factors	  point	  to	  the	  importance	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  conflict	  itself	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  society	  as	  impacting	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Magnitude	  of	  violence	  is	  an	  attempt	  at	  addressing	  this	  cross-­‐section	  of	  the	  literature.	  It	  does	  not	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directly	  capture	  points	  specifically	  covered	  by	  Bassiouni,	  but	  it	  does	  begin	  to	  capture	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  conflict	  on	  society.	  The	  literature	  review	  demonstrated	  the	  importance	  of	  external	  actors,	  particularly	  international	  organizations	  and	  their	  action	  during	  conflict	  (Rothe	  and	  Mullins).	  External	  military	  funding	  builds	  upon	  their	  research	  by	  expanding	  the	  research	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  external	  actors	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  Specifically,	  this	  study	  looks	  at	  external	  actors	  providing	  military	  support	  during	  conflict.	  The	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  2012	  study	  found	  that	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  involvement	  of	  international	  organizations	  was	  important	  in	  subsequent	  implementation	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  variable	  external	  military	  funding	  was	  measured	  in	  a	  way	  that	  captured	  external	  actors	  involvement	  during	  the	  conflict.	  Lastly,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  conflict	  termination	  type	  arises	  from	  references	  in	  the	  literature	  review.	  Scholars	  widely	  hypothesize	  about	  the	  role	  of	  conflict	  termination	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  The	  consensus	  is	  that	  the	  type	  of	  conflict	  termination	  would	  be	  indicative	  of	  the	  type	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012;	  Lie,	  Binningsbo	  and	  Gates	  2007;	  Bassiouni	  2002).	  	  	  
B. Operationalization	  of	  the	  Influencing	  Factors	  
	  In	  this	  research,	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  conflict	  across	  society.	  The	  variable,	  in	  this	  study,	  follows	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  Major	  Episode	  of	  Political	  Violence	  database	  from	  the	  Integrated	  Network	  for	  Societal	  Conflict	  Research	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(INSCR).1	  The	  dataset	  ranks	  states	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  10	  based	  on	  the	  “magnitude	  of	  systemic	  impact,”	  (referencing	  the	  state	  system).	  	  Specifically,	  states	  are	  assessed	  based	  on	  the	  “comprehensive	  effects	  on	  the	  state	  or	  states	  directly	  affected	  by	  the	  warfare,	  including	  numbers	  of	  combatants	  and	  causalities,	  affected	  area,	  dislocated	  population	  and	  extent	  of	  infrastructure	  damage”	  (Marshall	  2015	  2).	  These	  effects	  translate	  into	  the	  10-­‐point	  scale	  ranging	  from	  Category	  01,	  Sporadic	  or	  Expressive	  Political	  Violence	  to	  Category	  10,	  Extermination	  and	  Annihilation.	  This	  study	  only	  utilizes	  the	  score	  labeled	  “CIVTOTAL”	  in	  the	  database.	  “CIVTOTAL”	  refers	  to	  a	  score	  that	  includes	  civil	  violence,	  civil	  warfare,	  ethnic	  violence	  and	  ethnic	  warfare.	  Interstate	  scores	  and	  regional	  scores	  are	  not	  included	  in	  this	  research,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  focus	  on	  internal	  magnitude	  of	  conflict.	  	  The	  INSCR’s	  Major	  Episodes	  of	  Political	  Violence	  database	  is	  coded	  as	  country-­‐conflict-­‐year,	  meaning	  that	  for	  every	  year	  that	  a	  state	  is	  in	  conflict	  the	  state	  received	  a	  score	  (Marshall	  2015).	  In	  order	  to	  utilize	  this	  database	  in	  this	  study,	  the	  scores	  were	  re-­‐calculated	  to	  match	  a	  base	  unit	  analysis	  of	  country-­‐conflict-­‐period,	  or	  one	  score	  for	  every	  period	  in	  which	  a	  state	  was	  in	  conflict.2	  This	  study	  accounted	  for	  this	  adjustment	  by	  calculating	  six	  different	  indicators	  of	  the	  variable.	  The	  first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  Major	  Episodes	  of	  Political	  Violence	  database	  assesses	  the	  repercussions	  of	  the	  conflict	  through	  the	  state	  system,	  which	  provides	  one	  way	  to	  quantify	  and	  test	  parts	  of	  Bassiouni’s	  guidelines.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  Integrated	  Network	  for	  Societal	  Conflict	  Research	  (INSCR),	  which	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  Center	  for	  Systemic	  Peace.	  This	  United	  States	  based	  non-­‐profit	  also	  produces	  the	  State	  Fragility	  Index	  and	  the	  Polity	  Project.	  The	  dataset’s	  Excel	  file,	  SPSS	  file	  and	  codebook	  can	  be	  accessed	  at	  http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.	  	  2	  To	  create	  a	  useable	  dataset	  for	  this	  research,	  the	  data	  must	  be	  in	  the	  same	  base	  unit	  of	  analysis.	  When	  the	  data	  is	  drawn	  from	  different	  datasets,	  these	  datasets	  utilize	  different	  units	  of	  analysis.	  This	  research	  uses	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis	  “country-­‐conflict-­‐episode.”	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indicator	  of	  the	  variable	  was	  a	  mean,	  or	  average,	  of	  the	  CIVTOTAL	  scores	  for	  the	  entire	  length	  of	  the	  state’s	  period	  of	  conflict.	  The	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  mean	  was	  recorded	  as	  the	  second	  coding	  of	  the	  variable.	  The	  minimum	  CIVTOTAL	  score,	  the	  maximum	  CIVTOTAL	  score	  and	  the	  last	  year’s	  CIVTOTAL	  score	  within	  the	  state’s	  period	  of	  conflict	  was	  documented.	  Lastly,	  the	  average	  of	  the	  last	  three	  years	  of	  conflict	  was	  calculated.	  Creating	  six	  variations	  of	  the	  variable,	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  allows	  for	  the	  ability	  to	  account	  for	  the	  variations	  within	  the	  variable.	  This	  methodological	  choice	  arises	  from	  the	  need	  to	  change	  the	  base	  unit	  of	  analysis,	  which	  causes	  different	  ways	  to	  record	  the	  variable.	  Creating	  multiple	  variations	  allows	  for	  the	  data	  from	  the	  INSCR	  dataset	  to	  be	  cultivated	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  most	  usable	  for	  this	  research,	  and	  thus	  allows	  the	  hypothesis	  to	  be	  tested	  in	  multiple	  ways.	  	  
External	  military	  funding	  as	  an	  influencing	  factor	  specifically	  refers	  to	  the	  financial	  funding	  of	  military	  support	  by	  actors	  outside	  of	  the	  conflict.	  In	  this	  research,	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  made	  between	  who	  is	  receiving	  the	  funding,	  so	  as	  to	  distinguish	  between	  a	  state	  actor	  receiving	  support	  or	  the	  opposing	  side.	  The	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  has	  a	  project	  titled	  External	  Support	  Data,	  which	  aligns	  with	  the	  independent	  variable	  “external	  military	  funding.”	  Beginning	  in	  1970	  the	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  has	  collected	  data	  on	  violence	  and	  has	  thus	  set	  the	  standard	  for	  gathering	  this	  type	  of	  information.	  Their	  definition	  of	  armed	  conflict	  has	  become	  widely	  regarded	  as	  the	  accepted	  standard	  (Högbladh,	  Pettersson	  and	  Themner	  2011).	  This	  study	  utilizes	  a	  particular	  subset	  of	  the	  External	  Support	  Data	  called	  “External	  Support:	  Primary	  Warring	  Party	  Dataset,”	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which	  disaggregates	  the	  type	  of	  external	  support	  provided	  to	  warring	  actors.3	  The	  dataset	  covers	  information	  from	  1975	  to	  2010	  (Högbladh,	  Pettersson	  and	  Themner	  2011).	  This	  study’s	  variable	  external	  military	  funding	  pulls	  only	  from	  the	  External	  Support	  Project’s	  variable	  “External_$.”	  The	  variable,	  external	  military	  funding:	  	  covers	  any	  form	  of	  economic	  aid	  that	  was	  extended	  by	  an	  external	  supporter	  in	  order	  to	  be	  used	  to	  fund	  the	  waging	  of	  the	  armed	  conflict	  or	  is	  given	  to	  the	  warring	  party.	  This	  includes	  military	  loans,	  military	  grants,	  and	  military/defense	  to	  be	  used	  towards	  improving	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  military.	  This	  also	  includes	  intercession	  or	  support	  in	  front	  of	  multilateral	  financial	  institutions	  (such	  as	  the	  [World	  Bank]	  or	  the	  [International	  Monetary	  Fund])	  or	  other	  lenders.	  Note	  that	  this	  type	  of	  support	  typically	  does	  not	  include	  humanitarian,	  development	  or	  balance	  of	  payments	  aid/loans.	  (Högbladh,	  Pettersson	  and	  Themner	  2011	  19)	  The	  inclusion	  of	  this	  particular	  variable	  provides	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  study	  conducted	  by	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  found	  that	  the	  involvement	  of	  international	  organizations	  to	  be	  important.	  Specifically,	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  found	  the	  involvement	  of	  international	  organizations,	  particularly	  the	  United	  Nations,	  during	  the	  conflict	  to	  be	  an	  indicator	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  (Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  2012).	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  external	  military	  funding	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  UCDP’s	  database	  means	  that	  the	  support	  was	  provided	  during	  the	  conflict,	  which	  remains	  consistent	  with	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard’s	  finding.	  External	  military	  funding,	  therefore,	  is	  an	  expansion	  in	  testing	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  support.	  	  	  Like	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  variable,	  the	  external	  military	  funding	  was	  recoded.	  The	  External	  Support	  Project	  database	  is	  country-­‐conflict-­‐year-­‐side	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  choice	  to	  use	  the	  External	  Support:	  Primary	  Warring	  Party	  Dataset	  arose	  from	  the	  need	  to	  see	  which	  actor	  received	  support	  during	  the	  conflict.	  The	  External	  Support:	  Primary	  Warring	  Party	  Dataset	  was	  selected	  as	  it	  “is	  best	  suited	  for	  analysis	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  receiver	  of	  support”	  (Uppsala	  website).	  The	  codebook	  and	  dataset	  can	  be	  accessed	  at	  http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_external_support_data/.	  	  
39	  	  
(Högbladh,	  Pettersson	  and	  Themner	  2011).	  To	  make	  the	  variable	  functional,	  four	  indicators	  were	  coded.	  “StateExternalReceived”	  is	  a	  dichotomous	  variable,	  with	  a	  “1”	  indicating	  that	  the	  state	  actor	  in	  the	  conflict	  period	  received	  external	  military	  funding	  support.	  “YrsStateReceived”	  is	  a	  total	  of	  all	  the	  years	  within	  the	  conflict	  period	  that	  the	  state	  actor	  received	  support.	  Conversely,	  “SideBReceived”	  is	  a	  dichotomous	  variable,	  with	  “1”	  indicating	  that	  the	  opposing	  side	  in	  the	  given	  conflict	  received	  support,	  while	  “YrsSideBReceived”	  is	  a	  total	  of	  all	  the	  years	  within	  the	  conflict	  period	  that	  the	  opposing	  side	  received	  support.	  The	  decision	  to	  include	  four	  variations	  of	  this	  independent	  variable	  provides	  the	  ability	  to	  test	  the	  variable	  slightly	  differently.	  The	  indicators	  “StateExternalReceived”	  and	  “SideBReceived”	  have	  a	  bounded	  range,	  between	  0	  and	  1.	  Outcomes	  from	  this	  analysis	  model	  will	  reveal	  if	  support	  given	  to	  the	  actor	  changes	  the	  likelihood	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Alternatively,	  the	  indicators	  “YrsStateReceived”	  and	  “YrsSideBReceived”	  could,	  hypothetically,	  have	  a	  score	  equivalent	  to	  the	  number	  of	  years	  the	  conflict	  endures	  (i.e.	  if	  the	  conflict	  lasts	  for	  fifteen	  years,	  the	  state	  actor	  could	  receive	  external	  military	  funding	  for	  15	  years,	  thus	  receiving	  a	  score	  of	  15).	  This	  coding	  creates	  a	  much	  larger	  range	  and	  the	  outcome	  from	  the	  analysis	  can	  reveal	  if	  continued	  support	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  	  A	  third	  independent	  variable	  highlights	  conflict	  termination	  as	  an	  influencing	  factor.	  This	  variable	  is	  defined	  by	  how	  the	  conflict	  ends.	  It	  is	  included	  as	  a	  variable	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Justice	  Dataset,	  which	  is	  the	  dataset	  that	  this	  research	  utilizes	  to	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also	  operationalize	  the	  dependent	  variables.4	  It	  captures	  information	  for	  “all	  extrasystemic,	  internationalized	  internal,	  and	  internal	  armed	  conflicts	  from	  1946	  to	  2006,	  with	  at	  least	  25	  annual	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  as	  coded	  by	  the	  UCDP/	  PRIO	  Armed	  Conflict	  Dataset”	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012	  731).	  	  In	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  Justice	  Dataset,	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis	  is	  country-­‐conflict-­‐episode,	  which	  does	  not	  require	  any	  adjustments	  for	  this	  research.	  	  For	  conflict	  termination	  type,	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  Justice	  Dataset	  codes	  to	  reflect	  three	  possible	  outcomes	  from	  a	  conflict:	  bargained	  solution,	  victory	  or	  other	  (Binningsbo,	  Loyle,	  Gates	  and	  Elster	  2012).	  A	  bargained	  solution	  is	  coded	  as	  a	  “1,”	  victory	  is	  a	  “2”	  and	  the	  category	  other	  is	  a	  “3.”	  A	  bargained	  solution	  denotes	  an	  outcome	  where	  opposing	  actors	  cooperated	  to	  end	  the	  conflict,	  like	  for	  a	  peace	  agreement	  or	  ceasefire.	  Victory	  indicates	  that	  one	  side	  defeats	  the	  other	  side.	  For	  this	  research,	  the	  variable	  “other”	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  research	  due	  to	  the	  vagueness	  of	  the	  term.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  variable,	  conflict	  termination,	  was	  recoded	  to	  include	  only	  bargained	  solution	  as	  “0”	  and	  victory	  as	  “1.”	  
	  
II. Post-­Conflict	  Justice	  Mechanisms:	  Dependent	  Variable	  	  
	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  There	  are	  two	  layers	  of	  definitional	  and	  coding	  complexity	  that	  create	  the	  dependent	  variable:	  (1)	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  and	  (2)	  specific	  mechanisms	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  The	  format	  outlined	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  which	  utilizes	  three	  broad	  theoretically	  derived	  categories,	  retributive	  justice,	  restorative	  justice	  and	  immunity	  measures,	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  Access	  to	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  Justice	  Dataset	  codebook	  and	  dataset	  can	  be	  found	  at	  http://www.justice-­‐data.com/pcj-­‐dataset/.	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continued	  into	  the	  research	  to	  create	  hypotheses.	  These	  three	  categories,	  as	  they	  did	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  are	  disaggregated	  into	  two	  specific	  forms	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  In	  this	  research,	  retributive	  justice	  covers	  prosecutions	  and	  purges,	  restorative	  justice	  covers	  truth	  commissions	  and	  reparations,	  and	  immunity	  measures	  covers	  amnesty	  and	  exiles.	  	  To	  best	  understand	  the	  variables,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  explain	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  Justice	  Dataset,	  as	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  all	  captured	  under	  this	  dataset,	  before	  defining	  the	  specific	  dependent	  variables.	  This	  comprehensive	  record	  provides	  data	  on	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  efforts	  that	  include	  trials,	  truth	  commissions,	  reparations,	  amnesties,	  purges	  and	  exiles.	  	  Across	  all	  the	  dependent	  variables,	  the	  “dataset	  codes	  justice	  processes	  which	  were	  implemented	  within	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  period,	  up	  to	  5	  years	  after	  the	  termination	  of	  a	  given	  conflict”	  (Binningsbo,	  Loyle,	  Gates	  and	  Elster	  2012	  4).	  This	  research	  has	  chosen	  to	  follow	  this	  coding	  as	  it	  best	  represents	  mechanisms	  that	  had	  sway	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  period.	  The	  database	  codes	  the	  mechanisms	  as	  dichotomous	  variables.	  Given	  the	  approach	  undertaken	  in	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  justice	  Database,	  it	  is	  logical	  and	  methodologically	  sound	  for	  this	  research	  to	  mirror	  the	  same	  definitions	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  	  	  The	  coding	  is	  dichotomous.	  Methodologically,	  the	  first	  dependent	  variable	  is	  a	  simplified,	  aggregated	  category	  labeled	  pcj_dummy.	  It	  is	  dichotomous	  in	  nature,	  with	  a	  code	  of	  “1”	  representing	  that	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  was	  implemented	  following	  conflict	  and	  a	  code	  of	  “0”	  indicating	  that	  no	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  was	  implemented	  following	  conflict.	  This	  methodological	  choice	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follows	  the	  methods	  utilized	  by	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard’s	  (2012)	  study	  and	  is	  consistently	  continued	  through	  the	  remaining	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Retributive	  justice,	  in	  this	  study,	  is	  defined	  as	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  retaliatory	  in	  nature	  and	  produce	  direct	  forms	  of	  accountability.	  It	  is	  measured	  through	  two	  forms	  of	  retributive	  justice,	  prosecutions	  and	  purges.	  Prosecutions	  are	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  trials	  and	  are	  the	  “examination	  of	  alleged	  wrongdoing	  through	  judicial	  proceedings	  within	  a	  legal	  structure”	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012	  734).	  A	  trial,	  arrest,	  charges	  or	  sentences	  are	  all	  included	  as	  trial	  under	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  Justice	  Codebook	  as	  they	  indicate	  intention	  for	  a	  trial.	  	  
Purges	  are	  “the	  act	  of	  removing	  politicians,	  armed	  forces	  members,	  judiciary	  or	  other	  members	  of	  society	  for	  their	  (alleged)	  collaboration	  with	  or	  participation	  in	  a	  conflict	  and	  limiting	  their	  influence	  accordingly”	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012	  735).	  Both	  prosecutions	  and	  purges	  utilize	  retributive	  recourse.	  	  Restorative	  justice	  is	  the	  path	  to	  justice	  that	  seeks	  to	  be	  reparative,	  upholding	  accountability	  without	  being	  punitive	  in	  nature.	  Truth	  commissions	  and	  reparations	  are	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  mechanisms	  indicators	  of	  restorative	  justice.	  Truth	  
commissions,	  according	  to	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  Justice	  database,	  are	  “officially-­‐sanctioned,	  temporary	  investigative	  bodies	  that	  focus	  on	  a	  pattern	  of	  abuse	  over	  a	  particular	  period	  of	  time”	  that	  occur	  within	  five	  year	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  
reparations	  are	  “compensation	  given	  by	  the	  state	  to	  an	  individual	  or	  group	  who	  was	  harmed	  in	  some	  way	  during	  the	  conflict”	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012	  734).	  	  	  	   Immunity	  measure	  is	  the	  third	  dependent	  variable.	  It	  approaches	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  through	  alternative	  avenues	  that	  avoid	  accountability	  in	  order	  to	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allow	  for	  society	  to	  move	  forward	  and	  find	  justice	  through	  progress.	  It	  is	  encapsulated	  through	  the	  coding	  of	  amnesty	  and	  exile.	  Amnesty	  is	  the	  “promise	  (or	  in	  some	  cases	  formal	  legislation)	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  to	  not	  prosecute	  or	  punish	  past	  violators”	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012	  735).	  Exile	  is	  one’s	  absence	  in	  the	  state,	  either	  forced	  or	  voluntary,	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  (Binningsbo	  et	  al	  2012	  736).	  	  	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Hypotheses	  Matrix	  
	   Retributive	  Justice:	  Trials	  &	  Purges	  
(Y1)	  
Restorative	  Justice:	  








The	  greater	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  will	  
decrease	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice.	  
The	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  will	  
increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice.	  
The	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  will	  





Higher	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  
increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice.	  
Higher	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  support	  will	  
decrease	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice.	  
Higher	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  




When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  victory,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice	  
increases.	  When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  bargained	  solution,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice	  
decreases.	  
When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  victory,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice	  
decreases.	  When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  bargained	  solution,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice	  
increases.	  
When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  victory,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures	  




	  These	  hypotheses	  are	  testable	  and	  falsifiable,	  and	  they	  have	  been	  chosen	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  literature	  explored.	  Furthermore,	  the	  hypothesized	  statements	  remain	  valid	  when	  conversely	  stated.	  The	  table	  provides	  a	  visual	  of	  the	  collective	  hypotheses,	  but	  these	  hypotheses	  are	  broken	  down	  by	  independent	  variable	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  thought	  to	  be	  at	  play	  in	  the	  relationship.	  These	  hypotheses	  are	  primarily	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  literature.	  However,	  given	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  influencing	  factors	  literature,	  the	  production	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  often	  relied	  on	  the	  benefits	  and	  drawbacks	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Each	  grouping	  of	  hypotheses	  is	  presented	  with	  a	  null	  hypothesis	  related	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  a	  hypothesis	  for	  each	  category	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  	  	  a. Magnitude	  of	  Conflict	  	  HA0:	  The	  magnitude	  of	  a	  conflict	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  HA1:	  The	  greater	  the	  magnitude	  of	  conflict,	  than	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice	  will	  decrease.	  HA2:	  The	  greater	  the	  magnitude	  of	  conflict,	  than	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice	  will	  increase.	  HA3:	  If	  greater	  the	  magnitude	  of	  conflict,	  than	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures	  will	  increase.	  	   An	  absence	  of	  relationship	  between	  the	  magnitude	  of	  conflict	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  is	  indicated	  in	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  (HA0).	  HA1	  predicts	  that	  if	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  is	  great	  then	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice	  will	  decrease.	  This	  relationship	  is	  theorized	  for	  primarily	  two	  reasons,	  which	  relate	  to	  the	  hypothesized	  relationships	  displayed	  in	  HA2	  and	  HA3.	  First,	  with	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  conflict,	  more	  of	  society	  is	  impacted.	  The	  literature	  suggests	  that	  a	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strength	  of	  restorative	  justice	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  operate	  in	  broader,	  farther-­‐reaching	  conflict.	  Truth	  commissions,	  for	  example,	  aim	  to	  create	  a	  common	  narrative	  of	  the	  past,	  which	  brings	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  to	  a	  larger	  portion	  of	  society	  (Kritz	  2006;	  Lie	  2007).	  The	  emphasis	  on	  generating	  a	  common	  history	  that	  comes	  with	  restorative	  justice	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  necessary	  due	  to	  the	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  conflict.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  a	  drawback	  of	  retributive	  justice	  is	  its	  emphasis	  of	  accountability	  of	  a	  few	  individuals,	  with	  a	  narrower	  scope	  of	  focus	  (King	  2013).	  If	  magnitude	  of	  the	  conflict	  is	  great,	  reaching	  across	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  society,	  then	  the	  logic	  is	  that	  retributive	  justice	  becomes	  less	  applicable.	  However,	  restorative	  justice	  (HA2)	  is	  more	  valued	  following	  a	  conflict	  of	  great	  magnitude	  due	  to	  its	  reparative	  measures	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  be	  far-­‐reaching	  within	  society.	  Second,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  retributive	  justice	  is	  less	  as	  the	  magnitude	  of	  conflict	  increases,	  conceivably,	  due	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  retributive	  justice	  to	  prolong	  conflict.	  The	  literature	  relayed	  that	  a	  drawback	  to	  prosecutions	  and	  purges	  is	  that	  insistence	  on	  these	  justice	  mechanisms	  can	  intensify	  or	  draw	  out	  conflict,	  as	  warring	  parties	  battle	  more	  intensely	  to	  avoid	  losing	  and	  facing	  retributive	  measures	  (Bass	  2004,	  King	  2013).	  If	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  is	  high,	  then	  adding	  the	  pressure	  of	  retributive	  justice	  would	  likely	  only	  increase	  tensions	  and	  intensify	  the	  conflict,	  which	  is	  why	  HA1	  hypothesis	  that	  retributive	  justice	  becomes	  less	  likely.	  With	  the	  knowledge	  of	  being	  held	  accountable,	  either	  judicially	  or	  otherwise,	  the	  stakes	  of	  losing	  the	  conflict	  increases,	  and	  therefore	  retributive	  justice	  is	  less	  likely	  in	  states	  with	  a	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  conflict,	  where	  violence	  is	  intensely	  present.	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The	  ability	  of	  justice	  mechanisms	  to	  adjust	  based	  on	  the	  variable	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  connects	  to	  HA3,	  which	  indicates	  that	  a	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  conflict	  will	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures.	  The	  granting	  of	  amnesty	  or	  exile	  to	  perpetrators	  has	  historically	  been	  utilized	  to	  encourage	  violence	  to	  end,	  acting	  as	  a	  bargaining	  tool	  (Binningsbo	  2012).	  Therefore,	  HA3	  hypothesize	  that	  with	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures	  increases.	  Immunity	  measures	  is	  comprised	  of	  amnesty	  and	  exiles,	  and	  while	  a	  state	  cannot	  exile	  mass	  violators,	  it	  can	  grant	  amnesty	  to	  larger	  groups,	  especially	  if	  paired	  with	  a	  restorative	  justice	  measure.	  	  
b. External	  Military	  Funding	  HC0:	  External	  military	  funding	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  HC1:	  High	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice.	  HC2:	  High	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  decrease	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice.	  HC3:	  High	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures.	  	  HC0	  stands	  for	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  between	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  where	  the	  independent	  variable	  does	  not	  impact	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  The	  other	  three	  hypotheses	  operate	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  level	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  and	  the	  categories	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  HC1	  and	  HC3	  predict	  that	  high	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  increase	  retributive	  justice	  and	  immunity	  measures.	  HC2	  states	  that	  high	  levels	  of	  support	  decrease	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice	  being	  implemented.	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The	  prediction	  that	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  increase	  both	  retributive	  justice	  and	  immunity	  measures	  is	  contradictory,	  to	  an	  extent.	  The	  literature	  only	  limitedly	  discusses	  the	  role	  of	  external	  support	  in	  conflicts	  (Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  2012)	  and	  does	  not	  specifically	  discuss	  external	  military	  funding.	  The	  literature	  does	  not	  directly	  postulate	  relationships	  between	  the	  categories	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  and	  levels	  of	  external	  support,	  so	  the	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  generated	  based	  on	  knowledge	  of	  the	  three	  categories.	  	  HC1	  predicts	  that	  high	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  increase	  retributive	  justice.	  This	  hypothesis	  was	  developed	  out	  of	  several	  potential	  causal	  reasons.	  Retributive	  justice	  is	  composed	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  resource	  intensive.	  For	  a	  state	  to	  implement	  this	  mechanism,	  it	  must	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  cover	  the	  costs,	  either	  from	  internal	  structures	  or	  with	  the	  help	  from	  external	  supporters.	  Higher	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  indicate	  that	  actors	  outside	  of	  the	  state	  have	  some	  level	  of	  investment	  in	  the	  conflict.	  Although	  these	  actors	  are	  likely	  invested	  in	  the	  conflict	  to	  create	  a	  particular	  outcome,	  their	  expectations	  or	  requirements	  may	  remain	  in	  place	  during	  the	  transitional	  justice	  stage,	  when	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  are	  implemented.	  The	  international	  community,	  as	  a	  whole,	  promotes	  justice	  mechanisms	  that	  demonstrate	  a	  clear	  form	  of	  accountability.	  	  HC3	  the	  immunity	  measures	  category	  represents	  amnesty	  and	  exiles,	  two	  forms	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  that	  the	  international	  community	  associates	  with	  avoiding	  accountability	  for	  perpetrators.	  Despite	  this	  association,	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  higher	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  increase	  immunity	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measures	  arises	  from	  the	  postulation	  that	  the	  actors	  funding	  the	  military	  components	  of	  a	  conflict	  will	  push	  for	  immunity	  measures	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	  their	  own	  immunity	  in	  fueling	  the	  conflict.	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  literature	  on	  the	  topic,	  this	  hypothesis	  is	  self-­‐postulated.	  	  Restorative	  justice,	  which	  has	  a	  prediction	  that	  external	  military	  funding	  will	  decrease	  its	  implementation,	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  holistic	  and	  reparative	  drawer	  of	  transitional	  justice	  (Santa	  Barbara	  2007).	  Military	  funding	  represents	  actors	  invested	  in	  the	  conflict	  who	  have	  chosen	  to	  forgo	  reparative	  measures	  and	  to	  pursue	  militarized	  violence.	  Therefore,	  this	  study	  believes	  that	  the	  investment	  of	  these	  actors	  will	  not	  give	  great	  consideration	  to	  restorative	  justice	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  
c. Conflict	  Termination	  	  HD0:	  Conflict	  termination	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  HD1:	  When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  victory,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice	  increases.	  When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  bargained	  solution,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice	  
decreases.	  HD2:	  When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  victory,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice	  decreases.	  When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  bargained	  solution,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice	  
increases.	  HD3:	  When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  victory,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures	  
decreases.	  When	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  bargained	  solution,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures	  increases.	  	   As	  with	  the	  three	  hypotheses	  sets	  above,	  HD0	  is	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  indicating	  the	  absence	  of	  relationship	  between	  conflict	  termination	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  justice.	  The	  hypotheses	  for	  the	  three	  categories	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  indicate	  theorized	  relationships	  between	  two	  possible	  conflict	  termination	  outcomes:	  victory	  and	  bargained	  solution.	  The	  hypotheses	  are	  conversely	  related	  to	  the	  outcomes	  for	  each	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of	  the	  justice	  categories.	  For	  example,	  retributive	  justice	  increases	  in	  likelihood	  with	  victory	  but	  decreases	  with	  bargained	  solution.	  	  Retributive	  justice	  increases	  in	  likelihood	  following	  a	  conflict	  termination	  of	  a	  victory.	  The	  characteristics	  of	  retributive	  justice	  are	  punitive	  in	  nature	  and	  allow	  for	  retaliatory	  measures	  to	  take	  place	  through	  structured	  proceedings	  (Santa	  Barbara	  2007).	  King	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  prosecutions,	  one	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  under	  retributive	  justice,	  signal	  a	  clean	  break	  from	  the	  previous	  leaders	  and	  act	  as	  a	  declaration	  of	  a	  new	  period	  within	  the	  state.	  With	  a	  conflict	  terminating	  through	  victory,	  a	  clear	  winner	  appears	  and	  is	  given	  control	  of	  the	  state.	  This	  change	  provides	  the	  winners	  the	  responsibility	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  exert	  their	  dominance	  and	  leadership	  style.	  	  	   HD2	  and	  HD3	  state	  that	  bargained	  solutions	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice	  or	  immunity	  measures.	  These	  relationships	  are	  hypothesized	  because	  the	  conflict	  terminates	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  brings	  different	  sides	  together	  to	  negotiate.	  All	  sides	  are	  likely	  seeking	  immunity,	  in	  the	  hope	  to	  avoid	  accountability	  for	  their	  associated	  people.	  Both	  amnesty	  and	  exiles	  can	  act	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  help	  end	  conflict,	  as	  it	  provides	  warring	  parties	  security	  in	  stepping	  back	  from	  conflict	  without	  receiving	  punitive	  penalties	  later	  (Jeffrey	  2014,	  Binningsbo	  2012).	  	  	  	  
IV. Conducting	  the	  Research	   	  
	  In	  answering	  the	  research	  question,	  this	  study	  utilizes	  a	  large-­‐N	  quantitative	  method.	  This	  method	  was	  selected	  because	  the	  question	  seeks	  to	  identify	  the	  relationship	  of	  influencing	  factors	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  different	  post-­‐conflict	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justice	  mechanisms.	  A	  large-­‐N	  allows	  a	  large	  number	  of	  cases	  to	  be	  included.	  It	  is	  able	  to	  test	  many	  different	  cases,	  resulting	  in	  empirical	  numerical	  data,	  to	  reveal	  the	  relationship	  between	  influencing	  factors	  and	  different	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Furthermore,	  it	  lowers	  the	  amount	  of	  researcher	  bias	  in	  interpreting	  results.	  The	  process	  of	  collecting	  data	  must	  be	  conducted	  with	  minimal	  amounts	  of	  bias,	  which	  this	  study	  minimizes	  through	  combining	  previously	  collected	  datasets.	  Limitations	  of	  utilizing	  a	  large-­‐N	  include	  results	  that	  are	  too	  general	  or	  abstract,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  cannot	  explain	  specific	  conditions.	  Furthermore,	  a	  large-­‐N	  overlooks	  other	  explanations,	  as	  it	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  variables	  included	  in	  the	  study.	  	  This	  study	  utilized	  the	  program	  STATA	  to	  conduct	  regression-­‐based	  analysis.	  STATA	  was	  selected	  due	  to	  its	  acceptance	  in	  the	  field	  of	  political	  science	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  run	  bivariate	  and	  multivariate	  regression	  and	  predicted	  probability.	  Both	  bivariate	  and	  multivariate	  regression	  are	  used,	  as	  the	  results	  reveal	  different	  findings.	  A	  bivariate	  regression	  indicates	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  independent	  variable	  and	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  A	  multivariate	  regression	  includes	  multiple	  independent	  variables	  and	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  With	  a	  multivariate	  regression	  the	  results	  reveal	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  given	  independent	  variable,	  holding	  the	  other	  variables	  constant.	  Working	  with	  this	  study’s	  dataset	  required	  several	  adjustments	  due	  to	  nuances	  in	  the	  data	  and	  this	  portion	  of	  the	  methodology	  explains	  the	  specific	  steps	  taken	  during	  the	  analysis.	  	  Before	  running	  any	  regression,	  the	  variables	  included	  in	  that	  specific	  regression	  are	  tested	  for	  correlation.	  Each	  independent	  variable	  is	  paired	  with	  every	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dependent	  variable	  in	  bivariate	  regressions	  using	  the	  syntax	  “logit.”5	  To	  be	  considered	  statistically	  significant,	  z	  must	  be	  greater	  than	  1.95,	  with	  a	  p	  >	  |	  z|	  no	  more	  than	  .05.	  If	  these	  conditions	  are	  met,	  the	  relationship	  is	  considered	  statistically	  significant	  and	  further	  information	  can	  be	  extracted.	  The	  sign	  of	  the	  coefficient	  dictates	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  relationship.	  Immediately	  following	  the	  regression,	  the	  predicated	  probability	  is	  run.	  This	  step	  provides	  more	  interpretable	  information,	  specifically	  the	  percentage	  of	  likelihood	  that	  the	  relationship	  will	  occur.	  	  The	  multivariate	  regressions	  are	  then	  run,	  one	  for	  each	  dependent	  variable.6	  Immediately	  following	  the	  multivariate	  regressions,	  the	  predicted	  probability	  is	  run.	  For	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  the	  indicator	  for	  the	  maximum	  score	  of	  violence	  is	  utilized	  as	  it	  ranked	  most	  consistently	  in	  the	  bivariate	  analysis.	  Similarly,	  external	  military	  funding	  is	  represented	  only	  by	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  support	  to	  the	  state	  actor	  and	  Side	  B,	  not	  the	  total	  number	  of	  years	  that	  support	  was	  received	  for	  each	  side.	  For	  conflict	  termination	  type	  the	  indicator	  used	  is	  the	  dichotomous	  variable	  where	  0	  represents	  bargained	  outcome	  and	  1	  represents	  victory.	  Due	  to	  limitations	  in	  the	  data,	  there	  are	  slight	  adjustments	  to	  this	  procedure.	  Three	  of	  the	  mechanisms,	  purges,	  truth	  commission	  and	  reparation,	  had	  a	  small	  frequency.	  For	  these	  three	  mechanisms,	  the	  number	  of	  occurrences	  was	  under	  40,	  which	  is	  considered	  the	  minimal	  amount	  for	  running	  regressions.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  In	  the	  analysis,	  the	  dependent	  variable	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  theoretical-­‐derived	  categories,	  but	  rather	  each	  individual	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism.	  	  6	  Differences	  exist	  between	  the	  bivariate	  and	  multivariate	  regression	  results.	  A	  relationship	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  statistically	  relationship	  when	  tested	  in	  a	  bivariate	  regression.	  This	  occurrence	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  multivariate	  regression	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  other	  independent	  variables	  included.	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study	  utilized	  Gary	  King’s	  Rare	  Events	  software,	  which	  is	  able	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  low	  N	  and	  run	  a	  more	  accurate	  regression.7	  However,	  due	  to	  some	  limitations	  in	  the	  software,	  the	  regressions	  run	  using	  Rare	  Events	  software	  cannot	  calculate	  the	  predicated	  probability.	  The	  results	  for	  these	  specific	  dependent	  variables	  are	  still	  usable,	  but	  they	  are	  limited	  in	  that	  they	  cannot	  produce	  the	  percentage	  likelihood	  of	  that	  relationship.	  The	  variables’	  definitions	  contain	  details	  that	  aid	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  regressions,	  revealing	  a	  narrative	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  influencing	  factors	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Adjustments	  in	  the	  methodology,	  such	  as	  the	  dependent	  variables	  using	  the	  Rare	  Events	  software,	  shifts	  the	  level	  of	  analysis	  that	  can	  be	  conducted,	  while	  also	  disclosing	  valuable	  information	  for	  research.	  The	  information	  covered	  in	  this	  chapter	  becomes	  the	  base	  from	  which	  to	  understand	  the	  following	  analysis,	  which	  provides	  guidance	  to	  answering	  the	  research	  question,	  revealing	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  influencing	  factors	  and	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Accessible	  at	  http://gking.harvard.edu/relogit.	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Chapter	  Four:	  Analyzing	  the	  Relationship	  between	  Influencing	  Factors	  and	  
Post-­Conflict	  Justice	  Mechanisms	  
	  Testing	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  influencing	  factors	  and	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  provided	  a	  variety	  of	  results	  arising	  from	  both	  the	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  relationships.	  An	  overview	  of	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  provides	  insight	  to	  the	  data.	  	  This	  examination	  is	  also	  vital	  in	  establishing	  some	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  dataset,	  particularly	  where	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  have	  a	  small	  frequency	  of	  occurrence.	  	  	  	   Employing	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  hypotheses	  to	  analyze	  the	  regression	  results	  exposes	  that	  only	  one	  of	  the	  nine	  hypotheses	  can	  be	  evaluated.	  The	  sole	  result	  was	  the	  relationship	  between	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  and	  immunity	  measures.	  	  This	  outcome	  shows	  that	  increased	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  decreases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  implementing	  immunity	  measures,	  which	  does	  not	  match	  the	  predicted	  relationship.	  Since	  this	  relationship	  is	  the	  single	  occurrence	  that	  can	  be	  evaluated	  using	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  hypotheses,	  this	  study	  adjusts	  the	  approach	  to	  examine	  the	  hypotheses	  at	  the	  individual	  mechanism-­‐level.	  Following	  the	  account	  of	  this	  alteration,	  specific	  results	  from	  the	  bivariate	  and	  multivariate	  regressions	  are	  arranged	  according	  to	  the	  three	  influencing	  factors,	  beginning	  with	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  then	  external	  military	  funding	  and	  ending	  with	  conflict	  termination.	  	  
I. Exploring	  the	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
	  The	  descriptive	  statistics	  help	  in	  familiarizing	  the	  data	  and	  understanding	  the	  various	  nuances	  that	  exist.	  Depending	  on	  the	  variable	  being	  examined,	  different	  measures	  become	  critical.	  For	  example,	  the	  frequency,	  or	  number	  of	  occurrences,	  of	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a	  specific	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  is	  important	  relative	  to	  that	  specific	  variable,	  while	  the	  mean	  or	  range	  of	  scores	  for	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  can	  provide	  more	  insight	  for	  that	  particular	  variable.	  This	  section	  will	  begin	  with	  the	  independent	  variables	  and	  then	  will	  look	  at	  the	  dependent	  variables.	  	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  Magnitude	  of	  Violence	  
	  	   Maximum	  Score	  Received	   Minimum	  Score	  Received	   Score	  of	  the	  Final	  Year	  Magnitude	  of	  Violence	  Score	   Frequency	   Percent	   Frequency	   Percent	   Frequency	   Percent	  0	   82	   24.48	   110	   32.84	   94	   28.06	  1	   51	   15.22	   50	   14.93	   48	   14.33	  2	   31	   9.25	   32	   9.55	   31	   9.25	  3	   33	   9.85	   26	   7.76	   32	   9.55	  4	   45	   13.43	   48	   14.33	   45	   13.43	  5	   22	   6.57	   22	   6.57	   24	   7.16	  6	   21	   6.27	   14	   4.18	   21	   6.27	  7	   21	   6.27	   23	   6.87	   25	   7.46	  8	   8	   2.39	   3	   0.90	   4	   1.19	  9	   11	   3.28	   5	   1.49	   6	   1.79	  10	   10	   2.99	   2	   0.60	   5	   1.49	  Total	   335	   100	   335	   100	   335	   100	  Within	  the	  data	  related	  to	  the	  variable	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  there	  are	  335	  total	  observations.	  Each	  state	  could	  receive	  a	  score	  ranging	  between	  “0”	  to	  “10.”8	  	  The	  maximum	  score	  across	  a	  state’s	  entire	  period	  of	  conflict	  was	  recorded	  as	  an	  indicator	  with	  the	  score	  of	  “10.”	  This	  highest	  possible	  score	  occurred	  10	  times,	  or	  2.99%	  of	  the	  time.	  A	  score	  of	  0	  as	  the	  maximum	  score	  incurred	  by	  a	  state	  occurred	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Reference	  Table	  2	  for	  descriptive	  statistics	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence.	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82	  times,	  or	  24.48%	  of	  the	  time.	  Conversely,	  the	  minimum	  score	  across	  a	  state’s	  entire	  period	  of	  conflict	  was	  recorded	  as	  “0”	  110	  times	  or	  32.84%	  of	  the	  time	  and	  as	  a	  score	  of	  “10”	  just	  2	  times,	  which	  is	  0.60%	  of	  the	  time.	  The	  top	  three	  most	  frequent	  scores	  for	  the	  indicator	  representing	  the	  score	  of	  the	  final	  year	  of	  conflict	  within	  a	  period	  were	  “0”	  with	  94	  occurrences	  (28.06%),	  “1”	  with	  48	  cases	  (14.33%)	  and	  “4”	  with	  45	  incidents	  (13.43%).	  	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  External	  Military	  Funding	  
	  State	  Actor	  Received	  Support	   Side	  B	  Received	  Support	  	   Frequency	   Percentage	   Frequency	   Percentage	  0	  =	  No	  support	  received	   163	   75.12	   163	   75.12	  1	  =	  Support	  Received	   54	   24.88	   54	   24.88	  Total	   217	   100	   217	   100	  	   The	  number	  of	  observations	  for	  external	  military	  funding	  is	  217	  compared	  to	  the	  335	  observations	  for	  magnitude	  of	  conflict.9	  This	  difference	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  database	  cross-­‐comparison	  and	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  as	  it	  lowers	  the	  observances	  that	  can	  be	  utilized	  in	  the	  regressions,	  since	  only	  cases	  where	  all	  independent	  variables	  have	  data	  recorded	  are	  included.	  For	  external	  military	  funding,	  two	  pieces	  of	  information	  were	  gathered	  for	  both	  the	  state	  actor	  and	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  conflict,	  “Side	  B.”	  The	  first	  indicator	  demonstrates	  if	  the	  particular	  side	  received	  any	  external	  military	  funding	  during	  any	  year	  of	  the	  conflict,	  while	  the	  second	  indicator	  shows	  the	  number	  of	  total	  years	  the	  particular	  side	  received	  support.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Reference	  Table	  3	  for	  descriptive	  statistics	  of	  external	  military	  funding.	  	  
56	  	  
	   For	  the	  first	  set	  of	  indicators,	  the	  state	  actor	  received	  external	  military	  funding	  54	  times	  and	  did	  not	  receive	  any	  support	  163	  times.	  The	  numbers	  are	  exactly	  the	  same	  for	  “Side	  B,”	  although	  this	  similarity	  in	  occurrences	  in	  indicators	  is	  not	  due	  to	  the	  same	  results	  for	  each	  conflict,	  but	  rather	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  odd	  coincidence.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  variables	  do	  not	  correlate	  at	  a	  level	  that	  is	  unusable	  and	  do	  not	  create	  a	  case	  of	  multicollinearity.	  More	  information	  can	  be	  garnered	  from	  the	  second	  set	  of	  indicators,	  particularly	  from	  the	  range	  of	  accumulative	  years	  a	  given	  side	  received	  external	  military	  funding.	  For	  the	  state	  actor,	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  years	  that	  support	  was	  received	  was	  20.	  The	  outcome	  was	  slightly	  higher	  for	  “Side	  B”	  at	  a	  total	  of	  22	  years.	  In	  both	  indicators,	  the	  lowest	  number	  of	  years	  that	  support	  was	  received	  was	  0,	  which	  also	  happened	  to	  be	  the	  most	  frequently	  occurring	  result.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  4:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  Conflict	  Termination	  Type	  
	  Original	  Data	   Revised	  Data	  	   Frequency	   Percent	   	   Frequency	   Percent	  Bargained	  Outcome	   76	   23.24	   Bargained	  Outcome	   76	   40.86	  Victory	   110	   33.64	   Victory	   110	   59.14	  Other	   146	   43.12	   Total	   186	   100	  Total	   327	   100	  
	  
	   	   	  	  With	  327	  terminated	  conflicts	  in	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  Justice	  database,	  76	  ended	  through	  a	  bargained	  outcome	  and	  110	  ended	  with	  a	  victory	  for	  one	  side.10	  The	  remaining	  141	  cases	  were	  marked	  as	  “other.”	  To	  create	  a	  more	  accurate	  measure	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Reference	  Table	  4	  for	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  conflict	  termination	  type.	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the	  data,	  the	  category	  “other”	  was	  dropped,	  creating	  186	  total	  occurrences	  of	  data.	  The	  number	  of	  bargained	  outcomes	  and	  victories	  remained	  static,	  although	  the	  percent	  distribution	  shifted.	  With	  186	  occurrences,	  40.86%	  were	  bargained	  outcomes	  and	  59.14%	  were	  victory.	  In	  the	  Post	  Conflict	  Justice	  database,	  there	  exists	  174	  cases	  where	  conflict	  led	  to	  at	  least	  one,	  or	  more,	  form	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism.	  This	  number	  does	  not	  reflect	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  the	  occurrences	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  dataset,	  which	  is	  a	  total	  of	  275.	  The	  difference	  in	  these	  numbers	  reveal	  that	  there	  are	  occasions	  where	  a	  conflict	  occurred	  and	  more	  than	  one	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  was	  implemented.	  	  
	  
Table	  5:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  Post-­Conflict	  Justice	  Mechanisms	  
	  	   Trial	   Purges	   Truth	  Commis.	   Repara-­‐tions	   Amnesty	   Exile	  Frequency	   79	   15	   9	   20	   93	   59%	  Percentage	   24.16%	   4.59%	   2.75%	   6.12%	   28.44%	   18.04%	  	  With	  the	  help	  of	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  frequencies	  are	  not	  evenly	  dispersed	  across	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.11	  Amnesty	  has	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  episodes	  at	  93,	  followed	  by	  trials,	  which	  were	  implemented	  79	  times.	  Exiles	  had	  a	  frequency	  of	  59.	  The	  remaining	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  have	  occurrences	  below	  40,	  which	  puts	  them	  at	  risk	  for	  being	  statistically	  insignificant.	  As	  a	  result,	  all	  three	  classify	  as	  “Rare	  Events”	  and	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Reference	  Table	  5	  for	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  (trial,	  purge,	  truth	  commissions,	  reparations,	  amnesty	  and	  exile).	  	  
58	  	  
analyzed	  using	  the	  Rare	  Events	  logit.	  The	  rare	  events	  are	  partially	  reflective	  of	  how	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  were	  defined.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  be	  counted	  in	  the	  data,	  it	  had	  to	  occur	  within	  five	  years	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict	  Binningsbo,	  Loyle,	  Gates	  and	  Elster	  2012	  4).	  The	  smallest	  frequency	  occurred	  with	  truth	  commissions	  at	  only	  9	  episodes.	  Purges	  occurred	  15	  times	  and	  reparations	  had	  20	  cases	  recorded.	  This	  information,	  which	  is	  extrapolated	  through	  the	  descriptive	  statistics,	  provides	  a	  framework	  to	  interpret	  the	  results.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  the	  nuances	  of	  the	  data	  that	  explain	  particular	  occurrences	  and,	  at	  times,	  place	  limitations	  on	  the	  regressions.	  	  
II. Evaluating	  the	  Hypotheses	  
	  The	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  severely	  restrict	  the	  ability	  to	  evaluate	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories.	  Table	  6	  illustrates	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories,	  as	  only	  one	  of	  the	  nine	  hypotheses	  can	  be	  evaluated	  (the	  relationship	  between	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  and	  immunity	  measures).	  The	  remaining	  eight	  relationships	  cannot	  be	  evaluated,	  which	  is	  indicated	  with	  the	  diagonal	  line	  through	  the	  box.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  hypothesis	  to	  be	  evaluated,	  both	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  under	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  had	  to	  return	  statistically	  significant	  results.	  Boxes	  with	  the	  diagonal	  line	  indicate	  that	  either	  one	  or	  both	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  did	  not	  have	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  with	  the	  independent	  variable.	  Only	  one	  box	  has	  results,	  where	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  demonstrated	  a	  statistically	  significant	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relationship	  with	  amnesty	  and	  exile,	  the	  two	  mechanisms	  under	  immunity	  measures.	  	  
	  
Table	  6:	  Theoretically	  Derived	  Categories	  Hypotheses	  Matrix12	  
	  	   Retributive	  Justice:	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   The	  results	  of	  these	  two	  mechanisms	  are	  important,	  as	  the	  findings	  are	  consistent	  in	  both:	  when	  the	  maximum	  score	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  increases,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  amnesty	  and	  exile	  decreases.	  This	  occurrence	  is	  the	  only	  time	  that	  the	  hypotheses	  can	  be	  evaluated	  at	  the	  categorical-­‐level	  (Table	  6).	  These	  findings	  do	  not	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  for	  immunity	  measures,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  “X,”	  which	  predicted	  that	  a	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  would	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures.	  Given	  that	  both	  mechanisms	  are	  categorized	  as	  immunity	  measures,	  the	  consistent	  results	  leave	  room	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  is	  an	  analytical	  link	  as	  well	  as	  a	  theoretical	  link	  between	  the	  categories	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  (	  \)	  indicates	  that	  the	  relationship	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant;	  (−)	  indicates	  a	  negative	  sign	  for	  the	  coefficient;	  (✗)	  indicates	  that	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  could	  not	  be	  rejected	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mechanism-­‐specific	  analysis.	  However,	  the	  positive	  connection	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  an	  affirmative,	  as	  this	  parallel	  is	  just	  one	  example.	  	  
	   	  
Table	  7:	  Mechanism-­Level	  Hypotheses	  Evaluation13	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III. Adjusting	  the	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  Hypotheses	  	  
	  While	  this	  study	  believes	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  three	  theoretically	  derived	  categories,	  (retributive	  justice,	  restorative	  justice,	  and	  immunity	  measures)	  to	  establish	  the	  hypotheses	  remains	  a	  methodologically	  sound	  concept,	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  chapter	  proves	  the	  need	  to	  evaluate	  each	  mechanism	  individually	  against	  the	  given	  hypothesis.	  The	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  three	  theoretical	  derived	  categories	  arose	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  (	  \)	  indicates	  that	  the	  relationship	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant;	  (−)	  indicates	  a	  negative	  sign	  for	  the	  coefficient;	  (+)	  indicates	  a	  positive	  sign	  for	  the	  coefficient;	  (✔)	  indicates	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  was	  validated;	  (✗)	  indicates	  that	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  could	  not	  be	  rejected	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from	  a	  literature	  review	  that	  revealed	  patterns	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Similarities	  in	  the	  patterns,	  based	  on	  the	  means	  of	  reaching	  these	  goals,	  were	  used	  to	  create	  the	  three	  theoretically	  derived	  categories.	  	  Given	  the	  severe	  limitations	  in	  assessing	  the	  hypotheses	  as	  originally	  discussed,	  the	  analysis	  slightly	  alters	  the	  method	  of	  evaluating	  them.	  Undertaking	  an	  adjustment	  in	  evaluating	  the	  hypotheses	  provides	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  to	  analyze	  and	  exposes	  notable	  results.	  The	  same	  hypotheses	  presented	  in	  Table	  1	  hold,	  but	  are	  evaluated	  at	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  	  mechanism	  level.	  This	  approach	  keeps	  the	  dependent	  variables	  disaggregated	  during	  the	  hypothesis	  evaluation.	  For	  example,	  the	  hypothesis	  presented	  for	  the	  relationship	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  and	  retributive	  justice	  is	  now	  utilized	  to	  separately	  evaluate	  the	  two	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  listed	  under	  retributive	  justice	  (trial	  and	  purges).	  With	  this	  adjustment	  in	  the	  hypothesis	  approach,	  there	  are	  eight	  relationships	  that	  can	  be	  evaluated	  against	  the	  hypotheses.	  
	  
A. Magnitude	  of	  Violence	  	  
	  Magnitude	  of	  violence	  was	  found	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  variable	  pcj_dummy	  and	  to	  three	  specific	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms:	  trial,	  amnesty	  and	  exiles.	  While	  the	  independent	  variable,	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  had	  6	  different	  indicators,	  the	  most	  consistently	  significant	  indicator	  was	  the	  maximum	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score	  of	  violence	  recorded	  in	  a	  period	  of	  conflict.14	  Consistency	  in	  the	  different	  indicators	  was	  demonstrated	  because	  when	  a	  given	  dependent	  variable	  was	  tested,	  the	  different	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  indicators	  could	  replace	  one	  another	  and	  receive	  the	  same	  coefficient	  sign.	  	  For	  the	  pcj_dummy,	  all	  variations	  of	  the	  variable	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  found	  that	  the	  odds	  of	  pcj_dummy	  decrease	  as	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  score	  increases.	  In	  the	  multivariate	  equation	  for	  pcj_dummy,	  where	  all	  other	  variables	  were	  held	  constant,	  a	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  the	  maximum	  score	  of	  violence	  decreased	  .316	  in	  the	  log	  odds	  of	  pcj_dummy	  (Table	  9).	  The	  interpretation	  of	  this	  result	  is	  that	  as	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  increases,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  any	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  being	  implemented	  decreases.	  The	  analysis	  of	  specific	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  reiterates	  this	  finding.	  	  Across	  all	  five	  measures	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  trial	  decreases	  as	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  score	  increases.	  A	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  the	  maximum	  score	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  decreases	  -­‐.445	  in	  the	  log	  odds	  of	  trial,	  holding	  all	  else	  constant	  in	  the	  multivariate	  equation	  (Table	  9).	  This	  finding	  means	  that	  as	  the	  level	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  increases,	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  trial	  is	  implemented	  decreases.	  The	  finding	  for	  trial	  aligns	  with	  my	  hypothesis	  for	  retributive	  justice,	  which	  predicted	  that	  higher	  magnitudes	  of	  violence	  would	  decrease	  the	  likelihood	  of	  trials.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  indicators	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  are	  (1)	  mean	  score	  of	  conflict	  period	  (2)	  standard	  deviation	  of	  mean	  (3)	  minimum	  score	  in	  conflict	  period	  (4)	  maximum	  score	  in	  conflict	  period	  (5)	  the	  last	  score	  recorded	  in	  conflict	  period	  (6)	  mean	  score	  of	  last	  three	  years	  in	  the	  conflict	  period.	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After	  this	  first	  presentation	  of	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  between	  the	  influencing	  factor	  and	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms,	  the	  decision	  to	  rework	  the	  hypothesis	  evaluation	  methodology	  is	  modeled.	  Trial	  is	  categorized	  as	  a	  retributive	  justice	  mechanism,	  as	  are	  purges.	  However,	  purges	  did	  not	  show	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  with	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  (Table	  8	  and	  11).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  category	  of	  retributive	  justice	  cannot	  be	  evaluated	  for	  its	  hypothesized	  relationship	  to	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  (Table	  6),	  which	  originally	  predicted	  that	  as	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  increased,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  retributive	  justice	  would	  decrease	  (Table	  1).	  With	  the	  adjustment	  discussed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  which	  concludes	  that	  the	  analytical	  level	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  must	  be	  disaggregated	  to	  the	  mechanism	  level,	  trials	  can	  still	  be	  evaluated	  against	  the	  hypothesis	  (Table	  7).	  This	  description	  serves	  to	  further	  explain	  the	  decision	  to	  revaluate	  the	  method	  of	  evaluating	  the	  hypotheses	  at	  the	  mechanism	  level.	  	  Both	  forms	  of	  immunity	  measures,	  amnesty	  and	  exile,	  had	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  with	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  (Table	  8	  and	  11).	  For	  amnesty,	  the	  only	  indicator	  that	  showed	  a	  statistical	  relationship	  was	  the	  maximum	  score	  recorded	  during	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  conflict.	  The	  multivariate	  regression	  revealed	  that	  a	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  maximum	  score	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  decreases	  -­‐.243	  in	  the	  log	  odds	  of	  amnesty.	  Essentially,	  as	  the	  maximum	  score	  increases,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  amnesty	  decreases.	  As	  Table	  7	  demonstrates,	  the	  relationship	  provided	  by	  the	  multivariate	  regression	  matches	  the	  prediction	  of	  the	  hypothesis.	  	  Exile	  has	  a	  distinct	  relationship	  with	  magnitude	  of	  violence.	  In	  the	  multivariate	  regression,	  the	  results	  found	  that	  exile	  did	  not	  have	  a	  statistically	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significant	  relationship	  (Table	  9).	  However,	  when	  exile	  was	  tested	  in	  a	  bivariate	  regression,	  the	  relationship	  was	  found	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant	  (Table	  8).	  In	  the	  bivariate	  equation,	  the	  results	  revealed	  that	  a	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  maximum	  score	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  decreases	  -­‐.123	  in	  the	  log	  odds	  of	  amnesty.	  This	  statement	  means	  that	  as	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  increases,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  exile	  decreases.	  The	  hypothesis	  forecasted	  that	  the	  greater	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures	  would	  increase	  (Table	  1).	  These	  two	  statements	  correspond,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  supported	  (Table	  7).	  The	  results	  of	  these	  two	  mechanisms	  are	  important,	  as	  the	  findings	  are	  consistent	  in	  both:	  when	  the	  maximum	  score	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  increases,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  amnesty	  and	  exile	  decreases.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  this	  occurrence	  is	  the	  only	  time	  that	  the	  hypotheses	  can	  be	  evaluated	  at	  the	  categorical-­‐level	  (Table	  6).	  These	  findings	  do	  not	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  for	  immunity	  measures,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  “X,”	  which	  predicted	  that	  a	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  would	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures.	  With	  both	  mechanisms	  categorized	  as	  immunity	  measures,	  the	  consistent	  results	  leave	  room	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  is	  an	  analytical	  link	  as	  well	  as	  a	  theoretical	  link	  between	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  and	  the	  mechanism-­‐specific	  analysis.	  However,	  the	  positive	  connection	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  an	  affirmative,	  as	  this	  parallel	  is	  just	  one	  example.	  	  The	  remaining	  three	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  (purges,	  truth	  commissions	  and	  reparations)	  did	  not	  demonstrate	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  with	  magnitude	  of	  violence.	  Therefore,	  the	  hypotheses	  cannot	  be	  evaluated	  (Table	  7).	  All	  three	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  classified	  as	  rare	  events.	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While	  the	  Rare	  Event	  software	  aids	  in	  correcting	  for	  the	  low	  N,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  low	  frequency	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  skewed	  the	  results.	  	  
B. External	  Military	  Funding	  
	  The	  variable	  external	  military	  funding	  did	  not	  return	  many	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  to	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  Only	  trial	  and	  reparations	  returned	  statistically	  significant	  relationships.	  For	  both	  of	  these	  mechanisms,	  the	  results	  differed	  slightly	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  regression	  was	  a	  bivariate	  or	  a	  multivariate.	  Pcj_dummy,	  purges,	  truth	  commissions,	  amnesty	  and	  exiles	  did	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  predictor	  in	  any	  category.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  trials	  and	  the	  support	  received	  by	  both	  the	  state	  and	  Side	  B	  is	  statistically	  significant.	  In	  the	  multivariate	  regression,	  support	  received	  by	  the	  state	  actor	  is	  statistically	  significant,	  while	  support	  received	  by	  Side	  B	  is	  not	  (Table	  9).	  As	  external	  military	  funding	  to	  the	  state	  actor	  increases,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  trial	  decreases.	  Specifically,	  if	  state	  actors	  receive	  external	  military	  funding,	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  trial	  is	  implemented	  is	  10.44%,	  while	  if	  support	  is	  not	  received,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  trial	  is	  37.83%.	  These	  results	  reveal	  that	  when	  external	  military	  funding	  to	  the	  state	  actor	  is	  absent,	  a	  trial	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur,	  which	  does	  not	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  presented	  for	  retributive	  justice,	  which	  stated	  that	  higher	  levels	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  would	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  retributive	  justice	  mechanism	  (Table	  7).	  	  A	  similar	  result	  occurs	  during	  the	  bivariate	  regression	  that	  finds	  external	  military	  funding	  to	  Side	  B	  to	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  to	  trials	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(Table	  8).	  In	  this	  scenario,	  when	  Side	  B	  receives	  funding,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  trial	  decreases.	  The	  likelihood	  of	  a	  trial	  when	  there	  is	  no	  external	  military	  funding	  to	  Side	  B	  is	  28.27%.	  With	  support	  given	  to	  Side	  B,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  trial	  is	  6.81%.	  Again,	  this	  finding	  does	  not	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  for	  retributive	  justice	  (Table	  7).	  	  Reparations	  also	  had	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  to	  external	  military	  funding.	  With	  the	  multivariate	  regression,	  when	  Side	  B	  received	  external	  military	  support,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  reparations	  increased	  (Table	  9).	  In	  the	  multivariate	  regression,	  the	  relationship	  between	  reparation	  and	  state	  actors	  receiving	  support	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  yet	  the	  bivariate	  regression	  did	  reveal	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  (Table	  8).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  bivariate	  regression,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  reparations	  increases	  when	  state	  actors	  receive	  aid.	  The	  hypothesis	  for	  restorative	  justice	  was	  not	  supported,	  as	  it	  predicted	  that	  higher	  levels	  of	  military	  support	  would	  decrease	  the	  likelihood	  of	  restorative	  justice	  (Table	  7).	  	  	  
C. Conflict	  Termination	  	  The	  independent	  variable,	  conflict	  termination,	  specifically	  refers	  to	  termination	  types	  as	  either	  victory	  or	  bargained	  outcome.	  The	  multivariate	  regressions	  for	  trial	  and	  exile	  indicate	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  with	  conflict	  termination,	  while	  a	  bivariate	  regression	  finds	  a	  statistically	  relationship	  between	  reparations	  and	  conflict	  termination.	  Purges	  and	  amnesty	  did	  not	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  with	  conflict	  termination,	  and	  truth	  commission	  returned	  an	  ambiguous	  result.	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With	  a	  relationship	  identified	  between	  conflict	  termination	  and	  trial,	  further	  information	  can	  be	  extracted.	  A	  multivariate	  regression	  between	  the	  two	  variables	  found	  that	  a	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  conflict	  termination	  type	  increases	  2.093	  in	  the	  log	  odds	  of	  trial	  (Table	  9).	  Specifically,	  a	  trial	  is	  18.68%	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  after	  a	  bargained	  outcome	  compared	  to	  a	  49.06%	  likelihood	  following	  a	  victory.	  These	  results	  translate	  to	  mean	  that	  if	  the	  conflict	  termination	  is	  a	  victory,	  then	  a	  trial	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  implemented	  compared	  to	  conflict	  termination	  as	  a	  bargained	  outcome.	  The	  hypothesis	  set	  forth	  for	  the	  retributive	  justice	  category	  matches	  this	  result	  (Table	  7).	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  conflict	  termination	  type	  and	  exiles	  was	  statistically	  significant	  as	  well.	  For	  exiles,	  the	  results	  from	  the	  multivariate	  regression	  reveal	  that	  a	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  the	  conflict	  termination	  type	  increases	  3.402	  in	  the	  log	  odds	  of	  exile	  (Table	  9).	  Essentially,	  this	  statement	  means	  that	  as	  conflict	  termination	  type	  increases,	  meaning	  that	  it	  is	  a	  victory,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  exiles	  increases.	  The	  predicted	  probability	  confirms	  this	  result	  as	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  a	  bargained	  outcome	  has	  a	  1.85%	  likelihood	  of	  exiles	  being	  implemented,	  while	  exiles	  have	  a	  likelihood	  of	  33.64%	  following	  victory.	  The	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  percentages	  is	  significant,	  revealing	  a	  far	  greater	  likelihood	  of	  exiles	  being	  implemented	  if	  a	  victory	  occurs.	  This	  result	  contradicts	  the	  hypothesis	  put	  forth	  for	  immunity	  measures,	  which	  predicted	  that	  external	  military	  funding	  would	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  immunity	  measures	  (Table	  1	  and	  7).	  	  Reparations	  also	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  to	  conflict	  termination	  type,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  bivariate	  regression.	  In	  this	  case,	  a	  one-­‐unit	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increase	  in	  the	  conflict	  termination	  type	  decreases	  2.034	  in	  the	  log	  odds	  of	  reparations	  (Table	  8).	  This	  outcome	  means	  that	  reparations	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  following	  a	  bargained	  outcome	  than	  after	  a	  victory.	  Due	  to	  the	  low	  number	  N	  of	  reparations,	  the	  predicted	  probability	  could	  not	  be	  completed	  and	  thus	  a	  specific	  percentage	  of	  likelihood	  cannot	  be	  assigned.	  However,	  this	  outcome	  can	  still	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  the	  hypothesis,	  and	  it	  supports	  the	  hypothesis	  proposed	  (Table	  7).	  	  Purge	  and	  amnesty	  revealed	  that	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  relation	  to	  conflict	  termination	  (Table	  8	  and	  Table	  9).	  With	  this	  information,	  given	  the	  specifics	  used	  in	  this	  study,	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  cannot	  be	  rejected	  in	  these	  two	  cases	  (Table	  7).	  For	  purges,	  the	  few	  number	  of	  observations	  could	  be	  a	  factor.	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  termination	  type	  that	  most	  correlates	  with	  purges	  or	  amnesty	  is	  “other.”	  This	  latter	  option	  is	  the	  likely	  explanation	  for	  the	  results	  of	  truth	  commissions.	  The	  bivariate	  regression	  for	  truth	  commissions	  and	  termination	  type	  could	  not	  be	  completed	  (Table	  8	  and	  Table	  9).	  While	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  few	  number	  of	  truth	  commission	  occurrences	  skews	  the	  data,	  further	  investigation	  into	  the	  data	  reveals	  that	  every	  occurrence	  of	  truth	  commission	  correlates	  with	  a	  termination	  type	  of	  “other.”	  This	  study	  chooses	  to	  include	  only	  termination	  types	  that	  were	  bargained	  outcomes	  or	  victory,	  which	  explains	  the	  inability	  to	  complete	  the	  analysis	  of	  truth	  commissions.	  However,	  this	  finding	  is	  still	  important	  and	  telling.	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IV. Discussion	  
	  With	  this	  articulation	  of	  the	  regression	  results,	  the	  research	  question	  still	  stands	  to	  be	  answered:	  what	  factors	  impact	  the	  form	  of	  post-­conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  
states?	  The	  material	  above	  reveals	  major	  gaps	  in	  the	  regression	  results,	  but	  there	  is	  still	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  information	  that	  can	  be	  extracted	  in	  helping	  to	  answer,	  at	  least	  partially,	  the	  research	  question.	  Adjustments	  in	  the	  hypothesis	  evaluation	  are	  reviewed,	  as	  the	  disaggregation	  provides	  key	  findings	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  influencing	  factors	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  study	  did	  not	  return	  enough	  results	  to	  be	  able	  to	  conclude	  if	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  hold	  when	  tested.	  Table	  6	  demonstrates	  this	  limitation.	  The	  only	  occurrence	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  the	  soundness	  of	  utilizing	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  is	  when	  amnesty	  and	  exiles	  are	  tested	  for	  their	  relationship	  to	  magnitude	  of	  violence.	  In	  these	  relationships,	  both	  amnesty	  and	  exiles	  returned	  negative	  coefficient	  signs.	  This	  result	  does	  not	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  put	  forth	  for	  immunity	  measures,	  which	  predicted	  that	  greater	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  would	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  its	  implementation	  (Table	  1).	  The	  consistency	  in	  both	  mechanisms	  upholds	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories;	  it	  does	  not	  nullify	  the	  possibility	  that	  these	  three	  overarching	  categories	  could	  hold	  analytically.	  However,	  one	  instance	  of	  success,	  where	  both	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  under	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  category	  are	  in	  harmony,	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  confirmation	  of	  the	  analytical	  validity.	  	  	  While	  the	  hypotheses,	  when	  evaluated	  at	  the	  mechanism-­‐level,	  held	  up	  fewer	  times	  than	  they	  did	  not,	  the	  divergence	  in	  predictions	  and	  results	  reveals	  interesting	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phenomena.	  As	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  increased,	  it	  consistently	  decreased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  trials,	  amnesty	  and	  exiles,	  the	  three	  mechanisms	  that	  had	  statistically	  significant	  relationships.	  Essentially,	  the	  more	  impact	  a	  conflict	  has	  on	  society,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  that	  trials,	  amnesty	  and	  exiles	  are	  implemented.	  These	  outcomes	  validate	  the	  hypothesis	  related	  to	  trials,	  but	  do	  not	  match	  the	  predictions	  connected	  to	  amnesty	  and	  exiles.	  	  External	  military	  funding	  was	  an	  influencing	  factor	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  trials	  and	  reparations.	  The	  direction	  to	  these	  relationships	  were	  different	  as	  higher	  external	  military	  funding	  decreased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  trials	  being	  implemented	  and	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  reparations	  occurring.	  Neither	  of	  these	  results	  matched	  the	  hypotheses	  set	  forth	  for	  this	  influencing	  factor.	  	  Conflict	  termination	  was	  found	  to	  have	  a	  relationship	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  trials,	  reparations	  and	  exiles.	  Again,	  trials	  and	  exiles	  had	  similar	  relationships,	  in	  that	  when	  conflict	  termination	  was	  a	  victory,	  their	  likelihood	  of	  implementation	  increased.	  Trials	  confirm	  the	  hypothesized	  relationship	  from	  Table	  1,	  whereas	  exiles	  contradict	  the	  corresponding	  hypothesis,	  which	  had	  predicted	  that	  exiles’	  implementation	  was	  less	  likely	  following	  a	  victory.	  Reparations,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  more	  likely	  when	  conflict	  termination	  type	  was	  a	  bargained	  outcome,	  matching	  the	  corresponding	  hypothesis.	  Truth	  commissions	  were	  found	  to	  occur	  when	  the	  conflict	  termination	  type	  was	  neither	  victory	  nor	  bargained	  outcome,	  but	  when	  it	  was	  “other.”	  	  Do	  these	  results	  clearly	  dictate	  influencing	  factors	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms?	  The	  answer	  is	  far	  subtler.	  It	  exposes	  the	  necessity	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of	  mechanism-­‐level	  analysis,	  regardless	  of	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  being	  tested.	  The	  three	  categories,	  while	  acting	  as	  a	  theoretical	  framework,	  disintegrate	  when	  applied	  analytically.	  Adjusting	  the	  hypotheses	  evaluation	  to	  the	  mechanism	  level	  demonstrates	  that	  notable	  findings	  exist	  within	  the	  data,	  but	  the	  evaluation	  must	  occur	  with	  the	  mechanisms	  disaggregated.	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Chapter	  Five:	  Conclusion	  	  This	  research	  set	  out	  to	  discover	  what	  might	  influence	  the	  implementation	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms;	  the	  study’s	  conception	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  transitional	  justice	  literature	  about	  why	  different	  states	  utilize	  different	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Specifically,	  the	  study	  sought	  to	  answer	  the	  question:	  	  
what	  factors	  impact	  the	  form	  of	  post-­conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  states?	  A	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  revealed	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  attention	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  merits	  and	  demerits	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  and	  their	  means	  in	  reaching	  the	  goal	  of	  justice.	  	  This	  research’s	  methodology	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  Rothe	  and	  Maggard	  2012	  study,	  which	  is	  the	  primary	  endeavor	  in	  identifying	  relationships	  between	  influencing	  factors	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Given	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  suggested	  influencing	  factors	  and	  the	  limited	  amount	  of	  previous	  research	  exploring	  these	  relationships,	  there	  were	  many	  possible	  paths	  for	  this	  study.	  This	  research	  added	  to	  the	  literature	  by	  testing	  to	  see	  if	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  external	  military	  funding	  and	  conflict	  termination	  type	  influenced	  the	  type	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  implemented.	  Theoretically	  derived	  categories	  structured	  the	  literature	  review	  and	  were	  utilized	  to	  create	  hypotheses.	  However,	  the	  regressions	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  did	  not,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  return	  statistically	  significant	  results.	  The	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  may	  hold	  up	  with	  more	  testing,	  but	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  ensure	  the	  mechanisms	  can	  still	  be	  evaluated	  at	  the	  individual	  level.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  exiles	  and	  amnesty,	  jointly	  categorized	  as	  immunity	  measures,	  returned	  statistically	  significant	  relationships,	  the	  consistent	  results	  leave	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room	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  is	  an	  analytical	  link	  as	  well	  as	  a	  theoretical	  link	  between	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  and	  the	  mechanism-­‐specific	  analysis.	  However,	  the	  categories,	  while	  helpful	  in	  establishing	  knowledge	  about	  the	  mechanisms,	  should	  not	  overshadow	  the	  specific	  details	  about	  the	  different	  tools.	  Therefore,	  this	  study	  also	  conducted	  a	  mechanism-­‐level	  analysis,	  in	  order	  to	  observe	  more	  results	  that	  are	  statistically	  significant	  and	  notable.	  	  The	  answer	  to	  the	  research	  question	  was	  illuminated	  by	  the	  mechanism-­‐level	  examination.	  Purges	  had	  no	  statistically	  significant	  relationships	  to	  the	  three	  influencing	  factors,	  and	  neither	  did	  truth	  commissions	  (although	  conflict	  termination	  type	  uncovered	  that	  truth	  commissions	  occurred	  only	  after	  a	  termination	  of	  “other”).	  Trials	  had	  a	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  with	  all	  three	  influencing	  factors.	  The	  regressions	  revealed	  that	  higher	  scores	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  decreased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  trials’	  implementation,	  while	  a	  victory	  increased	  the	  likelihood.	  Reparations	  did	  not	  have	  a	  relationship	  with	  magnitude	  of	  violence,	  but	  external	  military	  funding	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  its	  implementation,	  as	  did	  a	  bargained	  outcome.	  Higher	  levels	  of	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  decreased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  amnesty	  and	  exiles,	  the	  two	  mechanisms	  under	  immunity	  measures.	  	  Exiles	  also	  had	  a	  relationship	  to	  conflict	  termination	  type,	  where	  victory	  increased	  its	  likelihood.	  	  	   In	  reviewing	  this	  study	  and	  its	  results,	  there	  are	  important	  implications	  to	  the	  surrounding	  literature	  on	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  and	  influencing	  factors.	  The	  three	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  structured	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  a	  way	  that	  highlighted	  the	  mechanisms’	  means	  of	  achieving	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justice.	  Crafting	  the	  literature	  in	  such	  a	  way	  highlighted	  a	  theoretical	  framework.	  However,	  using	  these	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  to	  evaluate	  the	  hypotheses	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  faulty	  decision.	  The	  lack	  of	  ability	  to	  appraise	  the	  hypotheses	  may	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  categories,	  while	  theoretically	  sound,	  do	  not	  hold	  up	  analytically.	  This	  study	  believes	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  three	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  to	  establish	  the	  hypotheses	  remains	  a	  valid	  concept,	  but	  that	  the	  implications	  of	  such	  a	  finding	  should	  shape	  the	  methodology	  of	  future	  research.	  Future	  research	  can	  test	  and	  see	  if	  the	  hypotheses	  at	  the	  categorical	  level	  hold;	  however,	  the	  value	  of	  mechanism-­‐level	  analysis	  is	  more	  informative	  and	  applicable.	  Selecting	  three	  influencing	  factors	  out	  of	  the	  literature	  required	  extensive	  investigation	  and	  organization	  of	  potential	  factors.	  Testing	  three	  specific	  influencing	  factors	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  literature,	  as	  they	  arose	  out	  of	  references	  from	  scholars.	  Increasing	  magnitude	  of	  violence	  decreased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  trials,	  amnesty	  and	  exiles.	  This	  finding	  validates	  Bass	  (2004)	  and	  King	  (2013)	  who	  hint	  that	  prosecutions	  would	  prolong	  conflict.	  This	  study’s	  results	  do	  not	  support	  Binningsbo’s	  	  (2012)	  belief	  that,	  due	  to	  exiles’	  and	  amnesty’s	  historical	  role	  as	  a	  bargaining	  tool	  to	  encourage	  the	  end	  of	  violence,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  implemented	  following	  intense	  conflict.	  The	  presence	  of	  external	  military	  funding	  decreased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  trials	  and	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  reparations.	  This	  result	  contradicted	  the	  proposed	  outcomes	  both	  times	  and	  demonstrated	  that	  external	  military	  funding	  may	  lead	  away	  from	  legal	  courses	  of	  action.	  Conflict	  termination	  type	  showed	  that	  victory	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  trials	  and	  exiles,	  while	  bargained	  outcomes	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  reparations.	  These	  results	  fall	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in	  line	  with	  the	  predicted	  outcomes	  for	  trials	  (Santa	  Barbara	  2007;	  King	  2013)	  and	  reparations	  (Jeffrey	  2014;	  Binningsbo	  2012).	  	  The	  implications	  of	  testing	  three	  specific	  influencing	  factors	  help	  to	  support	  claims	  by	  the	  literature,	  aiding	  to	  close	  the	  gap	  between	  potential	  causal	  relationships	  and	  tested	  relationships.	  	   One	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  this	  study	  was	  to	  collect	  various	  potential	  influencing	  factors	  from	  the	  literature.	  Much	  of	  the	  surrounding	  scholarship	  only	  references	  these	  potential	  influences;	  rarely	  are	  they	  discussed	  in	  detail	  or	  the	  research’s	  focus.	  This	  study	  adds	  to	  the	  literature	  by	  providing	  a	  concentrated	  overview	  of	  these	  factors	  and	  by	  testing	  three	  factors	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  Additionally,	  an	  important	  strength	  of	  this	  study	  is	  its	  demonstration	  that,	  regardless	  of	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  explored,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  work	  with	  the	  mechanisms	  as	  disaggregated	  as	  possible.	  While	  the	  theoretically	  derived	  categories	  and	  their	  corresponding	  hypotheses	  had	  limited	  analytical	  value,	  the	  further	  mechanism-­‐level	  analysis	  allowed	  the	  research	  to	  progress	  and	  have	  noteworthy	  findings.	  	   	  Adjusting	  the	  method	  of	  evaluating	  the	  hypotheses	  kept	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  disaggregated.	  This	  modification	  allowed	  for	  more	  relationships	  between	  the	  influencing	  factors	  and	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  to	  be	  explored.	  However,	  the	  need	  to	  keep	  the	  mechanisms	  disaggregated	  has	  implications	  about	  the	  theoretical	  and	  analytical	  approach.	  The	  need	  to	  evaluate	  each	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  independently	  speaks	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  recognizing	  the	  specific	  details	  of	  each	  mechanism.	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An	  additional	  drawback	  to	  this	  research	  was	  that	  the	  study’	  dataset	  was	  constrained	  by	  the	  three	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  that	  had	  low	  frequencies.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Rare	  Events	  software	  was	  utilized	  to	  help	  aid	  the	  regressions.	  These	  low	  frequencies	  may	  be	  connected	  to	  how	  the	  variables	  were	  defined	  and	  operationalized,	  as	  the	  clause	  “post-­‐conflict”	  required	  that	  mechanisms	  be	  implemented	  within	  five	  years	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict	  (Binningsbo,	  Loyle,	  Gates	  and	  Elster	  2012).	  Redefining	  the	  period	  “post-­‐conflict”	  is	  a	  potential	  way	  to	  expand	  the	  number	  of	  occurrences	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  within	  the	  dataset.	  However,	  these	  post-­‐conflict	  mechanisms	  are	  based	  on	  real	  events	  and	  the	  number	  recorded	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  number	  of	  occurrences	  that	  have	  actually	  happened.	  	  The	  larger	  force	  is	  the	  actual	  methodology	  employed.	  Large-­‐N	  studies	  are	  constrained	  by	  their	  need	  for	  a	  high	  number	  of	  occurrences,	  but	  also	  by	  their	  inability	  to	  consider	  other	  explanations,	  outside	  of	  the	  variables	  included	  in	  the	  study.	  This	  research	  does	  not	  include	  many	  of	  the	  potential	  influencing	  factors	  referenced	  by	  scholars,	  and	  the	  type	  of	  methodology	  employed	  by	  this	  study	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  them	  to	  be	  considered	  at	  any	  point.	  A	  different	  analytical	  approach,	  particularly	  a	  comparative	  case	  study,	  would	  allow	  for	  the	  researcher	  to	  assess	  a	  broader	  array	  of	  influencing	  factors	  in	  the	  context	  of	  each	  case.	  	  The	  literature	  review	  demonstrated	  the	  array	  of	  possibilities	  in	  Figure	  2.	  It	  would	  be	  futile	  to	  attempt	  to	  test	  every	  suggested	  influencing	  factor;	  however	  there	  are	  areas	  that	  should	  be	  drawn	  on	  by	  future	  researchers.	  One	  recommendation	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  decision-­‐making	  following	  conflict.	  This	  suggestion	  comes	  from	  Bassiouni’s	  overarching	  guidelines,	  which	  speak	  to	  those	  in	  power.	  As	  such,	  future	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research	  should	  look	  to	  identify	  the	  major	  actors	  following	  conflict	  and	  identify	  their	  role	  in	  implementing	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms.	  	  Another	  factor	  of	  influence	  that	  came	  up	  throughout	  the	  literature,	  but	  was	  not	  included	  in	  this	  study,	  is	  the	  interactive	  component	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  (Rothe	  and	  Mullins	  2008;	  Shaw	  2005;	  Kritz	  2002).	  This	  study’s	  data	  revealed	  that	  in	  a	  given	  conflict,	  more	  than	  one	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanism	  can	  be	  implemented.	  The	  interactive	  nature	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  makes	  it	  is	  incredibly	  difficult	  to	  trace	  which	  mechanism	  causes	  the	  other	  mechanism	  to	  be	  implemented.	  A	  different	  methodological	  approach,	  such	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  would	  be	  beneficial	  in	  studying	  this	  phenomenon,	  as	  this	  approach	  would	  not	  be	  limited	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  consider	  the	  context	  of	  the	  situation.	  This	  alternate	  procedure	  is	  an	  important	  consideration	  for	  future	  research.	  	   	  Answering	  the	  question	  has	  important	  normative	  implications,	  continued	  research	  should	  continue	  to	  probe	  this	  matter.	  If	  there	  are	  ways	  to	  predict	  the	  type	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  mechanisms	  that	  will	  be	  implemented,	  actors	  in	  the	  conflict	  can	  be	  better	  prepared	  to	  mobilize	  forces	  and	  initiate	  these	  justice	  mechanisms	  smoothly	  and	  efficiently.	  So	  much	  of	  the	  attention	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  literature	  focuses	  on	  evaluating	  these	  tools.	  More	  knowledge	  about	  factors	  of	  influence	  would	  provide	  the	  ability	  to	  guide	  efforts	  towards	  more	  appropriate	  mechanism	  given	  the	  situation.	  Better	  implementation	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  relieve	  states	  of	  the	  difficulties	  of	  transition	  and	  change	  that	  accompany	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  period.	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